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Abstract
Data cubes play an essential role in data analysis and decision support. In a data cube, data
from a fact table is aggregated on subsets of the table’s dimensions, forming a collection of
smaller tables called cuboids. When the fact table includes sensitive data such as salary or
diagnosis, publishing even a subset of its cuboids may compromise individuals’ privacy. In
this thesis, we address several problems about privacy-preserving publishing of data cubes
using differential privacy or its extensions, which provide privacy guarantees for individuals
by adding noise to query answers. The first problem is about how to improve the data quality
in privacy-preserving data cubes. Our noise-control frameworks choose noise source in a data
cube, i.e., an initial subset of cuboids to compute directly from the fact table with certain
amount of noise to be injected to each of them, and then compute the remaining cuboids
from them. We show that it is NP-hard to choose proper noise source for certain noise-
control objectives, but provide efficient approximation algorithms. The second problem is
about how to enforce consistency in the published cuboids. We proposed several approaches
with provable guarantee on the noise bound and one of them can even improve the utility of
differentially private cuboids (reducing error). The third problem is about how to calibrate
noise in data cubes subject to certain exact background knowledge while we are trying
to improve the data quality. The notation of generic differential privacy is applied, and we
generalize its properties to plug it into our noise-control frameworks for handling background
knowledge. Techniques proposed in this thesis provide advanced principles and major parts
of a complete solution towards privacy-preserving publishing of data cubes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Data cubes play an essential role in multidimensional data analysis and fast OLAP queries.
Simply put, a data cube of a fact table (i.e. a multidimensional table) consists of a collection
of cuboids, where each cuboid is generated by grouping records in the table by a subset
of dimensions. The publishing of data cubes can facilitate and speed up all kinds of data
mining algorithms. However, as the underlying data often is sensitive, publishing all or part
of a data cube may endanger the privacy of individuals. For example, privacy concerns
prevent Singapore’s Ministry of Health (MOH) from performing wide-scale monitoring for
adverse drug reactions among Singapore’s three main ethnic groups, none of which are
typically included in pharmaceutical companies’ drug trials. Privacy concerns also limit
MOH’s published health summary tables to extremely coarse categories, reducing their utility
for policy planning. Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval is now required for access
to most high-level summary tables from studies funded by the US National Institutes of
Health, making it very hard to leverage results from past studies to plan new studies. In
these, and many other scenarios, society can greatly benefit from the publication of detailed
and high-utility data cubes that also preserve individuals’ privacy. This thesis studies several
interweaving fundamental problems of data privacy in data cubes, including how to publish
a data cube in such a way that it can be browsed by users and utilized by different data
mining algorithms without endangering individuals’ privacy, how to improve the data quality
in such privacy-preserving data cubes, and how to guarantee individuals’ privacy information
even if adversaries have part of the data cube in their background knowledge.
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The data cube of a fact table consists of cells and cuboids. A cell aggregates the rows
in the fact table that match on certain dimensions. For example, consider the fact table
in Figure 1.1(a) with three dimensions, to be aggregated with count measure c. As in
Figures 1.1(b)-1.1(d), a cuboid can be viewed as the projection of a fact table on a subset
of dimensions, producing a set of cells with associated aggregate measures.
We aim to preserve data privacy so that individual level properties of the data are not
disclosed to adversaries. The definition of privacy has needed to become stronger, partly
because abundant data is now available from more and more sources on the Internet (ad-
versaries have more background knowledge), and computers become more and more powerful
(adversaries have stronger computational power). For example, according to the definition of
privacy (or security) proposed in 1980s [13, 17], individuals’ data is said to be secure if it can-
not be computed from a linear combination of rows in the released table. However, because
of the above two reasons, such protection of data privacy is far from sufficient nowadays, as
shown in the following examples in data cubes.
With background knowledge, an adversary can easily infer sensitive information about
an individual from a published data cube [33, 42, 78]. For example, in the data cube in
Figure 1.1, if we know that Alice is aged 31-40 and is in the table, the count measure c in
cuboid {Age, Salary} tells us her salary is 50-200k. If we know Bob is in the table and is
aged 21-30, we learn there is a 75% chance that his salary is 10-50k and a 25% chance it is
50-200k. If we also know that Carl, aged 21-30 and with salary 50-200k, is in the table, then
the values of count in cuboid {Age, Salary} tell us Bob’s salary is 10-50k.
Even publishing large actual aggregate counts is still not safe, if an adversary has enough
background knowledge. For example, suppose there are 100 individuals in a fact table
(Sex,Age, Salary), and we publish two cells (∗, ∗, 10-50k) and (∗, ∗, 50-200k), both with
count equal to 50. Suppose the adversary knows everyone’s salary except Bob’s: if 49 people
have salary 10-50k and 50 have 50-200k, it can be inferred that Bob’s salary is 10-50k.
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Sex Age Salary
F 21-30 10-50k
F 21-30 10-50k
F 31-40 50-200k
F 41-50 500k+
M 21-30 10-50k
M 21-30 50-200k
M 31-40 50-200k
M 60+ 500k+
(a) Fact Table T
Sex Age Salary c
∗ ∗ 0-10k 0
∗ ∗ 10-50k 3
∗ ∗ 50-200k 3
∗ ∗ . . . . . .
(b) Cuboid {Salary}
Sex Age Salary c
F 21-30 0-10k 0
F 21-30 10-50k 2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Cuboid {Sex,Age, Salary}
Sex Age Salary c
∗ 21-30 0-10k 0
∗ 21-30 10-50k 3
∗ 21-30 50-200k 1
∗ 21-30 200-500k 0
∗ 21-30 500k+ 0
∗ 31-40 0-10k 0
∗ 31-40 10-50k 0
∗ 31-40 50-200k 2
∗ 31-40 200-500k 0
∗ 31-40 500k+ 0
∗ . . . . . . . . .
(d) Cuboid {Age, Salary}
Figure 1.1: Fact Table and a count data cube
We apply the notion of ²-differential privacy [21] in data cube publishing. Compared
to previous techniques for privacy-preserving data publishing (see [1, 32] for surveys), dif-
ferential privacy makes very conservative assumptions about the adversary’s background
knowledge and computational power. It guarantees privacy against adversaries with arbi-
trary amounts of knowledge about each individual, as long as the data of individuals are
independent of each other [44]. In particular, mechanisms satisfying this definition guarantee
privacy against adversaries who may know every row in the database except one.
Informally, differential privacy guarantees that the presence/absence or specific value of
any particular individual’s record has little effect on the likelihood that a particular result is
returned to a query. Thus an adversary cannot make meaningful inferences about any one
individual’s record values, or even whether the record was present.
One way to achieve differential privacy is to add random noise to query results, called
the Laplacian mechanism [21]. In this mechanism, the noise is carefully calibrated to the
query’s sensitivity, which measures the total change of the query output when one individual
record/tuple is deleted or added in the database. For example, if the query is to count how
many rows satisfying property P, its sensitivity is one, because deleting/adding one row
3
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(b) Privacy-preserving data cube
Figure 1.2: Advantage of using privacy-preserving data cubes for data analytics
changes the count by at most one. As the variance of the noise increases, the privacy
guarantee becomes stronger, but the utility of the result drops. Another way is exponential
mechanism, where different outcomes are sampled according to noisy scoring functions [62].
There is a line of works which directly apply the notion of differential privacy in data
mining algorithms (e.g. constructing decision trees [31] and mining frequent patterns [8]).
The deficiency of such works is depicted in Figure 1.2(a): A data analyst may run different
data mining algorithms on the same table. Although each data mining algorithm is claimed
to be privacy-preserving independently, the adversary can combine results from different
algorithms to enhance their background knowledge about the fact table. Such background
knowledge reveals correlation inside the fact table, and thus could be more dangerous and
make individuals’ privacy more vulnerable. For example, each algorithm reports the number
of rows satisfying property P in its output, with a sample drawn from some noise distribu-
tion inserted into this number to preserve privacy; each algorithm is privacy-preserving by
itself; however, if the adversary averages the answers from multiple algorithms, the expected
squared error can be reduced significantly, with individuals’ privacy endangered.
Our proposal is depicted in Figure 1.2(b). We first publish a data cube in a privacy-
preserving way. This data cube can be reused by infinite number of data mining or processing
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algorithms. As long as these algorithms do not access the real fact table, the same privacy
guarantee is preserved from the data cube to these algorithms. The adversary cannot benefit
from combining results from different algorithms (Theorems 2.1.3 and 5.2.5). So the first
question is: how to improve the data quality in privacy-preserving data cubes.
To publish an ²–differentially private data cube over d dimensions, there are two natural
methods. (i) We can compute the count measure from the fact table, and then add noise to
each cell in each cuboid. There are 2d cuboids and modifying the value of one individual’s
record could change the count of some cell in every cuboid by 1. So the sensitivity (total
change) is 2d, and according to [26], each cell needs Laplace noise Lap(2d/²)1. This results
in noise with zero mean and variance equal to 2 · 4d/²2 added to every count. For reasonable
values of d, the variance is too large, which destroys the utility of the data cube. The same
idea is applied in one of the two approaches proposed in [5] to publish a set of marginals
of a contingency table. (ii) Or, we can directly add noise to the fact table, or the base
cuboid ({Sex, Age, Salary} in Figure 1.1(c)). Then Lap(1/²) suffices. We compute the other
cuboids from the noisy base cuboid to ensure differential privacy. However, noise in high-
level cuboids, such as {Salary}, will be magnified significantly, and thus the utility will be
low. For example, if a cell in a high-level cuboid aggregates N cells in the base cuboid, the
variance of noise in that cell is magnified by N times as well. This idea can be applied to
universal histograms, but noise accumulation also makes them ineffective there [40]. Another
possible way is to treat each cell as a query, and apply methods in [51] to answer a workload
of count queries while ensuring differential privacy. But this approach is not practical in our
context, as its running time/space is at least quadratic in the number of cells.
If we browse measures across differentially private cuboids, the sums may not match
the totals recorded in other higher-level cuboids, because independent noise is inserted into
different cells. According to a Microsoft user study [47], users are likely to accept these kinds
1A random sample from Lap(λ) has expectation equal to 0 and variance equal to 2λ2.
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of small inconsistencies if they trust the original data and understand why the inconsistencies
are present. However, if the users do not trust the original data, they may interpret the
inconsistencies as evidence of bad data. So it is desirable to enforce a requirement for
correct roll-up totals across dimensions in the cuboids to be published. Consistency also
boosts accuracy of differentially private data publishing in some cases, e.g., in answering
one-dimensional range queries [40]. The second question is: how to enforce consistency
in differentially private data cubes while retaining or even improving the data quality.
Some cuboids within a data cube, especially the high-level ones, may be published exactly
to both users and adversaries, either (i) because they are background knowledge that can
be easily obtained (for example, how many males or females in a company) or (ii) it is
required according to policies or requirement of data users. Such exact partial information
or background knowledge about a data cube can cause privacy breaches when combined
with differential privacy [43]. Intuitively, the more exact information released from a data
cube, the more noise needed to be inserted into the rest part to preserve the same level of
privacy. The third question is: how to calibrate noise in data cubes subject to certain
exact background knowledge while we are trying to improve the data quality.
Contributions. Towards answering the above three questions about publishing privacy-
preserving data cubes, the studies in this thesis can be summarized as follows.
• We study how to publish all or part of a data cube for a given fact table, while
ensuring ²-differential privacy and limiting the variance of the noise added to the cube.
We propose a general noise control framework in which a subset Lpre of cuboids is
computed from the fact table, plus random noise. The remaining cuboids are computed
directly from those in Lpre, which is the “source of noise”. When Lpre is larger, each of
its members requires more noise, but the cuboids computed from Lpre accumulate less
noise. So a clever selection of Lpre can reduce the overall noise. This framework can
be generalized by allowing injecting different amounts of noise into different cuboids in
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Lpre. With a larger search space, the generalized framework may potentially improve
the precision in a data cube while preserving the same level of privacy, which will be
demonstrated both in theory and in experiments later in this thesis.
• We consider several publishing scenarios that fit the needs of data agents, e.g., the
Ministry of Health. In the first scenario, a set of cuboids are identified to be released,
and the goal is to minimize the max noise in the cuboids. In the second scenario,
MOH has a large body of cross-tabulations that can be useful for urban planners and
the medical community. A weighting function indicates the importance of releasing
each cuboid. The question is, which of these cuboids can be released in a differentially
private manner, while respecting a given noise variance bound for each cell (called
precise cuboids)–the goal is to maximize the sum of the weights of the released precise
cuboids. In the third scenario, a threshold of noise variance is specified for each cuboid
to be released. The goal is to minimize the max relative ratio between the noise
variance and the expected threshold in each released cuboid.
We formalize these scenarios as three optimization problems for the selection of Lpre,
as well as the amount of noise in each cuboid of Lpre in the generalized framework,
prove that they are NP-hard, and give efficient algorithms with provable approximation
guarantees. For the first problem or the third, the max noise variance or the max
relative ratio, respectively, in published cuboids will be within a factor (ln |L|+ 1)2 of
optimal, where |L| is the number of cuboids to be published; and for the second, the
number/weight of precise cuboids will be within a factor (1− 1/e) of optimal.
• We show how to enforce consistency over a differentially private data cube by com-
puting a consistent measure from the noisy measure released by a differentially private
algorithm. We minimize the Lp distance between the consistent measure and the noisy
measure. Publishing consistent measures is differentially private, as we do not revisit
7
the fact table when enforcing consistency. The Lp distance from the consistent measure
to the real measure is at most doubled compared with the distance from the inconsis-
tent measure to the real measure, for general p. The consistency-enforcing techniques
in [5] are similar to our L∞ version. But we show that the L1 version yields a much
better theoretical bound on error than the L∞ version. More surprisingly, we show
that in the L2 version, the consistent measure provides even better utility than the
original inconsistent noisy measure, based on the theory of (weighted) least squares
and the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). We provide efficient algorithms to
compute such consistent measures (minimize L2 distance), with running time linear in
the number of cells, while previous techniques have at least quadratic running time.
• We study the relationship between the amount of background knowledge an adversary
has and the amount of noise needed to be injected in the scenario of data cubes. We
consider some cuboids that have to be released exactly as the background knowledge.
We generalize results in [43] about using generic differential privacy to handle such
background knowledge. Based these studies, we show how to plug generic differential
privacy into our noise control frameworks to limit the variance of the noise added to
data cubes subject to background knowledge in forms of exact cuboids.
• All of our techniques proposed in this thesis are both proved to be sound in theory and
evaluated with real datasets to verify their effectiveness in practice.
Organization. Chapter 2 provides background for data cubes and differential privacy,
together a review of related work. Chapter 3 introduces our noise control publishing frame-
works, and different optimization algorithms aiming at different objectives. Chapter 4 shows
how to enforce consistency across cuboids based on different Lp distances and analyzes their
properties. Chapter 5 studies how to handle adversary’s background knowledge. All experi-
ments are reported in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 gives conclusion and future directions.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
We present background materials and related work of this thesis in this chapter. We start
with a formal definition of differential privacy [26, 20] and its application in data cubes in Sec-
tion 2.1. We then introduce some related work in Section 2.2, including relevant techniques to
apply this notation of privacy in privacy-preserving data publication (Section 2.2.1) and data
mining (Section 2.2.2), and some recent progress on extending the notation of differential
privacy for more general context or with weaker/stronger privacy guarantee (Section 2.2.3).
2.1 Background and Notations
The notion of differential privacy was originally introduced in [20, 26]. It is general enough
to handle data models including unstructured data like search logs and structured data like
histograms and graphs, as long as they can be represented as a vector of entries. In this
thesis, we focus on data cubes, a modeling and analytical tool for multidimensional data.
We will introduce basic concepts of data cubes and differential privacy in this section.
2.1.1 Data Cubes
A fact table T is a multidimensional table with d nominal dimensions A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ad}.
We use Ai to denote both the i
th nominal dimension and the set of all possible values for
this dimension. Let |Ai| denote the number of distinct values (i.e., cardinality) of dimension
Ai. A fact table T is a set of rows, and for each row r ∈ T , r[i] is r’s value for Ai.
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The data cube [36] of a fact table T can be considered as the projections of T onto subset
of dimensions. A data cube consists of cells and cuboids. More formally, a cell a takes the
form (a[1], a[2], . . . , a[d]), where a[i] ∈ (Ai ∪ {∗}) denotes the ith dimension’s value for this
cell, and it is associated with certain aggregate measure of interest. In this thesis, we first
focus on the count measure c and discuss how to handle other measures like the summation
measure sum (sum of values associated with all rows in a cell) and the average measure avg
(average of values associated with all rows in a cell) in Section 3.4.2. The count measure
c(a) is the number of rows r in T that are aggregated in cell a (with the same values on
non-∗ dimensions of a). Formally, let c(a) = |{r ∈ T | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ d, r[i] = a[i] ∨ a[i] = ∗}|.
A cell a is an m-dim cell if values of exactly m dimensions a[i1], . . . , a[im] are not ∗. An
m-dim cuboid C is specified by m dimensions [C] = {Ai1 , . . . , Aim}, and it consists of all
m-dim cells a such that ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m, a[ik] ∈ Aik , and a[j] = ∗ for all j /∈ {i1, . . . , im}. We
use C and [C] interchangeably to denote either a cuboid or the set of dimensions specifying
this cuboid. A cuboid C can be interpreted as the projection of T on the set of dimensions
[C]. The d-dim cuboid is called the base cuboid and the cells in it are base cells.
For two cuboids C1 and C2, if [C1] ⊆ [C2] (denoted as C1 ¹ C2), then for a large class
of measures, such as count c, summation sum, and average avg, cells in C1 can be computed
from C2 [36]. The cuboid C1 is said to be an ancestor of C2, and C2 is a descendant of C1.
Let Lall denote the set of all cuboids. Clearly, (Lall,¹) forms a lattice.
Example 2.1.1 Fact table T in Table 1.1 has three dimensions: Sex = {M, F}; Age = {0-
10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 60+}; and Salary = {0-10k, 10-50k, 50-200k, 200-500k,
500k+}. Figure 2.1 shows the lattice of cuboids of T . Cuboid {Age, Salary} can be computed
from T . For example, to compute the cell (∗, 21-30, 10-50k), we refer to the table T for
rows (M, 21-30, 10-50k) and (F, 21-30, 10-50k), and we find three such rows. As {Salary} ⊆
{Age, Salary}, cuboid {Salary} can be computed from cuboid {Age, Salary}. For example, to
compute cell (∗, ∗, 10-50k), we aggregate cells (∗, 0-10, 10-50k), . . . , (∗, 60+, 10-50k).
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Figure 2.1: Lattice of cuboids in a data cube
2.1.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP for short in the rest of this thesis) is based on indistinguishability
between pairs of neighboring tables. Two tables T1 and T2 are neighbors if they differ by one
row, i.e., inserting or deleting one row from T1 yields T2. Formally, let T be the set of all
possible table instances with dimensions A1, A2, . . . , Ad, and Γ(T ) = {T ′ | |(T − T ′) ∪ (T ′ −
T )| = 1} ⊆ T the set of all neighbors of T . Clearly, T1 ∈ Γ(T2) implies T2 ∈ Γ(T1).
Definition 2.1.1 (Differential privacy [21]) A randomized algorithm K is ²-differentially
private if for any two neighboring tables T1 and T2 and any subset S of the output of K,
Pr [K(T1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(²)× Pr [K(T2) ∈ S] ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of K and ² is a fixed value.
Consider an individual’s concern about the privacy of her/his record r. When the pub-
lisher specifies a small ², Definition 2.1.1 ensures that the inclusion or exclusion of r in the
fact table makes little difference in the chances of K returning any particular answer.
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Some papers use a slightly different definition of neighbors: T1 and T2 are neighbors
if they have the same cardinality and T1 can be obtained from T2 by replacing one row
(²-indistinguishable [26]). Our algorithms and techniques in this thesis also work with this
definition, if we double the noise, because it has been shown that any mechanism satisfies
²-indistinguishability if and only if it satisfies 2²-differential privacy.
Tools to Achieve Differential Privacy
There are two popular ways to achieve ²-differential privacy, the Laplacian mechanism [21]
and the exponential mechanism [62]. In most (but not all) cases, the Laplacian mechanism
is used for data publication, whereas the exponential mechanism is used for optimization
problems. And, the Laplace mechanism is a special case of the exponential mechanism.
Throughout this thesis, we use R to denote the set of all real numbers. Let F : T → Rn
be a function that produces a vector of length n from a table instance. In our context (data
cubes), F computes the set of cuboids to be released. In the Laplacian mechanism, for a
table T , a noisy version F˜ (T ) of F (T ) is released to preserve differential privacy, and the
amount of noise is carefully calibrated according to the sensitivity of F .
Definition 2.1.2 (Sensitivity [21]) The L1 global sensitivity of F is:
S(F ) = max
T2∈T
(
max
T1∈Γ(T2)
‖F (T1)− F (T2)‖1
)
,
where ‖x − y‖1 =
∑
1≤i≤n |xi − yi| is the L1 distance between two n-dimensional vectors
x = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 and y = 〈y1, y2, . . . , yn〉.
For example, if the function F is to count how many rows satisfying property P, then
S(F ) = 1, because deleting/adding one row in T changes the count F (T ) by at most one.
12
Definition 2.1.3 (Laplacian distribution) Let Lap(λ) denote a sample Y taken from a
zero-mean Laplace distribution with probability density function h(x) = 1
2λ
exp(−|x|/λ). We
have Pr [|Y | ≥ z] = exp(−z/λ), E [Y ] = 0, and variance Var [Y ] = 2λ2. We write 〈Lap(λ)〉n
to denote a vector of n independent random samples 〈Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn〉, where Yi ∼ Lap(λ).
The following theorem quantifies how much noise to be injected into F (T ) is sufficient.
Theorem 2.1.1 (Laplacian mechanism [26]) Let F : T → Rn be a query sequence of
length n against a table T ∈ T . The randomized algorithm that takes as input table T and
output F˜ (T ) = F (T ) + 〈Lap(S(F )/²)〉n is ²-differentially private.
In the exponential mechanism, for a given table T ∈ T , an outcome r from a domain O
is randomly selected according to some scoring function s : T ×O → R and a base measure
µ : O → R. s and µ are public knowledge for everyone including adversaries. To achieve
differential privacy, the distribution for selecting (and publishing) r is carefully calibrated
with the scoring function s and the base measure µ, as in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.1.2 (Exponential mechanism [62]) For an input table T ∈ T , the probabil-
ity of selecting an outcome r ∈ O, is proportional to exp(² · s(T, r)) · µ(r). In particular,
the density function f(r) =
exp(² · s(T, r)) · µ(r)∫
r′ exp(² · s(T, r′)) · µ(r′)
.
Then selecting and publishing r satisfies ²∆(s)-differential privacy, where
∆(s) = max
r∈O
max
T2∈T
max
T1∈Γ(T2)
|s(T1, r)− s(T2, r)|.
Suppose the quality of outcomes is measured by the scoring function s. Based on the above
theorem, [62] shows that, using the exponential mechanism, there are some guarantees on
the outcome’s quality while the ²-differential privacy is preserved.
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The transition and composition properties of differential privacy are frequently used in
our and others’ research on differentially private algorithms. These two properties allow the
combining of the publications or outcomes of several differentially private algorithms.
Theorem 2.1.3 (Transition and composition properties [62, 59]) Let Ki(·) or Ki(·, ·)
be a randomized algorithm which is ²i-differentially private. Then,
1. For a table T , outputting K1(T ) and K2(T,K1(T )) is (²1 + ²2)-differentially private.
2. For any input table T and any algorithm K, outputting K1(T ) and K(K1(T )) is ²1-
differentially private.
3. For any two input tables T1 and T2 such that T1∩T2 = ∅, outputting K1(T1) and K1(T2)
is ²1-differentially private.
2.2 Related Work
Since ²-differential privacy (DP) [26] was introduced, many techniques have been proposed
for different data publishing and analysis tasks (refer to [21, 22, 24, 84] for a comprehensive
review). We will mainly review three aspects of recent research on developing (differential)
privacy-preserved algorithms: the first aspect is about data publishing and query answering
algorithms (Section 2.2.1); the second is about data mining algorithms (Section 2.2.2); and
the third is extensions to the notion of differential privacy (Section 2.2.3).
2.2.1 Differentially Private Data Publishing
Differential privacy has been applied in various data management and processing systems
[3, 4, 11, 59, 81]. In this part, we focus on (differentially) private histograms, count queries,
multidimensional data publishing, and batch-query processing techniques, as data cubes are
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essentially multidimensional count queries in nature, and cuboids to be published can be
thought as a batch of queries against the fact table to be answered.
Other mechanism to achieve differential privacy
Some functions F , e.g.., the median of a set of numbers, may have very large sensitivity S(F ),
e.g., the range of the universe. So the resulting Laplacian mechanism may need to inject too
much noise. To achieve differential privacy for a fixed table T , the amount of noise needed
to be injected is actually proportional to the local sensitivity S(F, T ) = maxT ′∈Γ(T ) ‖F (T )−
F (T ′)‖1 [66]. However, it may already violate the differential privacy to calibrate noise to
S(F, T ). So it is proposed in [66] to first obtain an approximate upper bound of S(F, T )
(called smooth sensitivity) without violating differential privacy, and then calibrate noise to
this upper bound. The resulting privacy guarantee, (², δ)-differential privacy [25], is weaker
than ²-differential privacy by additive factor δ. Also note that a more direct way to achieve
(², δ)-differential privacy is to addGaussian noise into F (T ) [25], and the techniques proposed
in this thesis can be also extended for (², δ)-differential privacy.
For a single counting query, a method to ensure differential privacy (geometric mecha-
nisms) [26] has been shown to be optimal under a certain user utility model [34], and the
Laplacian mechanism [26] is proved to be nearly optimal.
Recently, Li et al. [56] proposes the compressive mechanism based on compression tech-
nique. The basic idea is to insert noise into the compact synopsis, which is constructed using
random projections and has potentially smaller sensitivity than the original table.
Noise complexity of mechanisms for answering linear queries
Hardt and Talwar [39] study the noise complexity of differentially private mechanisms in
the setting where the user asks a set of linear queries non-adaptively. The noise complexity
means how much noise is necessary and sufficient to make the query answers differentially
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private. They show that the noise complexity is determined by two geometric parameters
associated with the set of queries, and derive nearly matching upper and lower bounds of
the amounts of noise needed to make the answer differentially private. This line of research
is followed by [38] and [37] to obtain better asymptotic bounds.
Both a one-dimensional histogram and a multidimensional data cube can be considered
as sets of linear queries. So the above upper and lower bounds also apply when we want to
publish them. But it is possible to utilize the special structure of such queries in histograms
or data cubes to further reduce the amount of noise needed. Also, instead of deriving
asymptotic bounds of noise, there is a line of research on how to model the amount of
noise needed as an objective function and solve an optimization problem to reduce noise in
answering batches of linear queries. Those different lines of research will be introduced in the
following parts. And it is an interesting and still quite open problem to compare different
lines of methods using systematical and comprehensive experiments.
One-dimensional histogram
Histogram can be thought as a one-dimensional data aggregation and is an important tool
for answering range queries. Hay et al. [40] propose an approach based on a hierarchy of
intervals, so-called universal histogram. Noise is injected into answers to count queries on
these intervals, and these noisy interval can be used to answer all possible range queries.
A naive method injects noise directly into the data domain, and answers range queries by
aggregating noisy data in the original domain. The error in the answers, if measured by
variance of noise, is reduced from O(m/²2) in the naive method to O(log3m/²2) in the
approach of [40]. Xiao et al. [80] propose to use the Haar wavelet for range count queries
with similar error bound guarantee, which can also handle multidimensional data.
The hierarchy structure in [40] is essentially a balanced binary tree similar to interval
tree [14]. A natural idea to reduce error could be optimize this tree structure, for example,
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by varying the depth or fanout of the tree. However, to guide such optimization, we may
need to access the statistics of the origin data, which already violates our privacy guarantee.
There are mainly two differentially private ways to do such optimization: the first one is
to use exponential mechanism, assigning a score for each possible structure, and selecting
the (approximately) best one using randomized algorithms; and the second one borrows the
ideas from smooth local sensitivity [66], using a noisy version of the statistics from we need
to guide the optimization – accessing such noisy statistics is differentially private, and it is
accurate enough for the purpose of optimization. These ideas are used in [67, 82, 83] to
reduce error in (multidimensional) histograms for count queries, and used in [79] to optimize
parameters in noise injection for reducing relative error. Such differentially private data
publication techniques are data-dependent. Other techniques that do not rely on statistics
about the input database are data-independent [84], including [40, 80] and ours.
Multidimensional data aggregation
Some techniques designed for differentially private histogram publication can be extended for
multidimensional data aggregation and publication (e.g. [80], [82], and [67]). For example,
Xiao et al. [80] also extend their wavelet approach to nominal attributes and multidimen-
sional count queries. Some other differentially private techniques are designed particularly
for publishing multidimensional data, e.g., [15] and [5] which are introduced below.
Cormode et al. [15] consider how to answer multidimensional range queries in a differen-
tially private way. They propose to use a quad-tree structure with Laplacian noise inserted
first, and then answer range queries using the noisy quad tree.
Barak et al. [5] show how to publish a set of marginals of a contingency table while
ensuring differential privacy. Here, marginals of a contingency table are essentially cuboids
in our data-cube language. One of their two approaches adds noise to all the cuboids to be
published. Since noise is injected into different cuboids independently, there is inconsistency
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across different noisy cuboids. [5] proposes a method based on linear programming (LP)
and rounding, which computes a consistent data cube from the noisy inconsistent one and
minimizes their L∞ distance. At the same time, integrality can be also enforced and negative
numbers can be removed in the publishing. In the later part of this thesis, we will show
that minimizing the L1 distance yields a much better theoretical bound on error. The
other approach in [5] is similar, but moves to the Fourier domain at first, and add noise to
Fourier coefficients. The major reason for moving to the Fourier domain is that the Fourier
coefficients are the “sufficient statistics” for marginals of a contingency table, in the sense
that if any Fourier coefficient is ignored, there is a free degree of freedom which can lead to
unbounded error between true and reported values [60]. But unlike our work, they do not
optimize the publishing strategy (the same amount of noise is injected into all cuboids or all
Fourier coefficients). Moreover, the number of variables in the linear programming equals
the number of cells (often > 106 in our experiments). So LP-based methods are mainly of
theoretical interests and can only handle data cubes with small numbers of cells.
Optimizing noise for batches of linear queries
Linear count queries ask questions like “how many rows in the table satisfying property P.”
When the database is modeled as a frequency vector, a linear count query can be presented
as a vector (specifying the property P). Suppose there is a batch of linear count queries to be
answered, which is presented as a query matrix (with query vectors as its columns), the very
basic method is to insert noise into the frequency vector and then compute the multiplication
of the noisy frequency vector and the query matrix. There is a line of work [51, 52, 53, 85]
on how to reduce error in answers to the given batch of linear queries.
Li et al. [51] propose a general framework called matrix mechanism to support answering
a given workload of count queries while preserving differential privacy. The basic idea is to
choose an alternative set of queries, represented as a strategy matrix, answer these strategy
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queries first using the Laplacian mechanism, and compute each query in the input workload
using the noisy answers to the strategy queries. The strategy matrix is carefully selected so
that every input query can be answered and the total error (sum-square error) is minimized.
They [52] propose an efficient algorithm to select a near-optimal strategy matrix, and also
give a lower bound of the total error one can get using the matrix mechanism [53]. While
[80] and [40] can be unified in the framework of matrix mechanism, the specific algorithms
given in [40, 80] are more efficient than the matrix multiplication used in [51, 52].
Yuan et al. [85] introduce a variant of the matrix mechanism, called low-rank mechanism.
They propose practical differentially private technique for answering batch queries with high
accuracy, based on a low rank approximation of the query matrix. They prove that the accu-
racy (measured by sum-square error) provided by their techniques is close to the theoretical
lower bound for any mechanism to answer a batch of queries under differential privacy. Note
that [52] and [85], aiming at the same goal, are developed independently and to be published
in the same year, so it will be very interesting to compare their performance.
Cormode et al. [16] apply the matrix mechanism to publish data cubes. A data cube can
be modeled as a batch of linear queries, each of which corresponds to a cube cell. But as the
number of cells is huge, the original matrix mechanism is inapplicable as the matrices involved
are too huge to be manipulated. [16] proposes an efficient noise-optimization algorithm and
a consistency-enforcing algorithm via grouping matrix entries that correspond to cells in
the same cuboid. So the matrices involved become small enough to be handled. Another
approach proposed in [16] tries to optimize the amounts of noise to be injected into Fourier
coefficients of cube cells, so that the overall noise is minimize. Different from our work, they
use sum-square error to measure the overall noise, while we use max-square error.
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Comparison to other privacy notations
Agrawal et al. [2] study how to support OLAP queries (cells or cuboids in data cubes)
while ensuring a limited form of (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy, by randomizing each entry in the fact table
with a constant probability. An OLAP query on the fact table can be answered from the
perturbed table within roughly
√|dataset| [5]. (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy is in general not as strong as
²-differential privacy. Also, the error incurred by this method [2] depends on the dataset size;
in our framework, the amount of noise to be added is data-independent, only determined by
the number of cuboids to be published and the structure of the fact table.
In data publication, differential privacy provides much stronger privacy guarantees than
other privacy concepts based on deterministic algorithms do, such as k-anonymity [69, 70, 73,
72], and its extension l-diversity [57] and t-closeness [54]. These privacy-preserving notations
and techniques suppress or generalize entries in the table such that groups of tuples appear
indistinguishable or uninformative about sensitive attributes. However, these techniques are
vulnerable if the adversary has enough background knowledge. [74, 75, 76] study how to
specify authorization and control inferences for OLAP queries in the data cube. They aim
to detect OLAP queries with either unauthorized accesses or malicious inferences.
2.2.2 Differentially Private Data Mining
Data mining algorithms usually access sensitive information about individuals, such as med-
ical records and search logs. It is an urgent task to develop privacy-preserving techniques so
that data owners are willing to share data miners with more data. For example, the notation
of differential privacy has been applied to releasing query and click histograms from search
logs [35, 45], recommender systems [61], publishing commuting patterns [58], publishing re-
sults of machine learning [9, 12, 41, 86], clustering [30, 66], decision tree [31, 64], mining
frequent patterns [8], and aggregating distributed time-series [68].
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There are two basic ideas to preserve differential privacy in data mining algorithms,
based on the Laplacian mechanism and the exponential mechanism, respectively. Using
the Laplacian mechanism, data mining algorithms take Laplacian-noise-injected data as the
input. Because of the transition and composition property (Lemma 2.1.3), the same level of
differential privacy is preserved in the data mining results as in the noisy data. In another
way, the exponential mechanism is applied internally in data mining algorithms. When the
algorithm needs to branch, it randomizes the branch selection according to some utility
function. For example, in decision tree learning, each branch determines which attribute to
be split and the utility function could be information gain of splitting an attribute.
2.2.3 Extension of Differential Privacy
We now introduce some variants of differential privacy, which can be applied for more general
context, and may have weaker or stronger privacy guarantee. They may also have different
assumptions about the adversary’s background knowledge (prior belief on the data).
The first one is (², δ)-differential privacy [25], which was already mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.1.2. It is a weaker variant of ²-differential privacy, and the difference is that, in
the definition of ²-differential privacy (Definition 2.1.1), the inequality is replaced with
Pr [K(T1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(²) × Pr [K(T2) ∈ S] + δ. (², δ)-differential privacy trades off privacy
for utility, via either smoothing local sensitivity or injecting Gaussian noise.
Generic differential privacy proposed in [43] takes background knowledge of adversaries
into consideration. It tries to fix bugs in the assumption of differential privacy, by modeling
the neighbors as two closest tables (or databases) that are consistent with the background
knowledge. Intuitively, the more knowledgeable the adversary is, the more noise needs to be
injected, and this notation quantifies how much noise is necessary. It provides us some hints
on how to select the mysterious parameter ². We will apply this notation in Chapter 5 of
this thesis, and thus more details about this notation will be introduced there.
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Pan-privacy [29] provides a stronger guarantee that the pan-private algorithms retain
the privacy properties even if their internal state becomes visible to adversaries. The study
of this notation was initiated in algorithms for data streams [23, 29, 63], as when sketches
used in streaming algorithms are hacked by adversaries, previous privacy guarantees will be
easily broken. Also event-level pan-privacy and user-level pan-privacy are distinguished in
[28]. Also because real system is usually required to continually generate outputs, the study
of (pan-)differential privacy under continual observation is initiated in [28].
Pufferfish [44] is a framework to create new privacy notations that are customized to
given applications. The Pufferfish framework provides differential privacy-like probabilis-
tic guarantee but with more expressive power in a general context. It allows expertise to
specify: i) what secrets about individual users need to be protected, which are expressed as
a potential set of secrets and pairs of secrets needed to be discriminated from each other;
and ii) adversaries’ belief in how the data were generated and their knowledge about the
database. In particular, ii) is specified because as discussed in [27, 43], proper assumption
about knowledge of adversary may improve the utility of privacy guarantees. Previous dif-
ferential privacy can be analyzed within the Pufferfish framework, and this framework also
enjoys useful (and more general) properties, like composition and self-composition.
Differential identifiability [48] is proposed recently to give more quantitative guidelines
on how to select the value of ² based on the level of privacy required. It also has implicit
assumptions and models about how the data is generated in adversary’s belief.
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Chapter 3
Optimizing Noise Sources in Data
Cubes
Problem Description
Given a d-dimensional fact table T , we aim to publish a subset L of all cuboids Lall with
measure c˜(·), a noisy version of the count measure c(·) in L, using an algorithm K that ensures
²-differential privacy. In particular, for any cell a in a cuboid in L, we want to publish a noisy
count measure c˜(a) using the differentially private algorithm K. With the level of privacy
fixed (i.e. the parameter ² in differential privacy is fixed), we want to minimize the error in
c˜(·), or the difference between c(·) and c˜(·), so that the utility of data is preserved as well.
In this chapter, we will first discuss how to measure the error in publishing algorithms
and possible objectives in Section 3.1, and then introduce noise-control publishing algorithms
that (approximately) achieve these objectives in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3.
3.1 Measuring Noise and Publishing Objectives
We measure the utility of an algorithm by the variance of the noisy measure it publishes.
As we apply the Laplacian mechanism in Theorem 2.1.1, we will show noisy measure c˜(·)
published by our algorithms is unbiased, i.e., the expectation E [c˜(a)] = c(a). So for one cell,
the noise variance Var [c˜(a)] is equal to the mean squared error of the noisy measure c˜(a) we
publish, and we use it to measure the noise/error in c˜(a) for one cell a:
Var [c˜(a)] = E
[
(c˜(a)− E [c˜(a)])2] = E [(c˜(a)− c(a))2] .
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Noise-control objectives
Ultimately, the differentially private data cube will be used by users or data mining al-
gorithms. So it is better to provide them enough flexibility to specify the noise-control
objectives they want to achieve. We consider two publishing scenarios. In the first scenario,
users identify a set of cuboids which must be released, and the issue is how to limit the
max noise in these cuboids. In the second scenario, a large body of cross-tabulations can be
useful. The question is, how many of these cuboids can be released in a differentially private
manner, while respecting a certain noise bound for each cell (in expectation)? Following are
two basic objectives we aim at to control the noise in the published cuboids:
(i) (Bounding max noise) Minimize the maximal variance over all cells, maxaVar [c˜(a)],
in the published cuboids (or minimize maxa (wa · Var [c˜(a)]) in the weighted version).
(ii) (Publishing as many as possible) Given a threshold θ0, a cuboid C is said to be precise
if Var [c˜(a)] ≤ θ0 for all cells a in C. Maximize the number of precise cuboids in all
published ones (or maximize
∑
C is precisewC in the weighted version).
These two objectives can be generalized by assigning a priority weight wa or wC on each
cell a or cuboid C, respectively. For example, some of these cuboids are more important
than others, so they have higher weights than others. Also, the cuboids containing relatively
smaller measures need to be published with smaller error inserted so that the overall relative
error is limited, so they may be assigned with higher weights. Our publishing algorithms
introduced later can be easily generalized to the weighted versions of (i) and (ii).
3.2 Optimizing Noise by Source Selection
Before presenting our first noise-optimizing approach Kpart, we introduce two straw man
approaches, Kall and Kbase, and discuss why these baseline solutions are not optimal.
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Straw man release algorithms Kall and Kbase
One option, Kall, is to compute the exact measure c(a) for each cell a in each cuboid in
L, and add noise to each cell independently, including empty cells. Formally, let Fall(T ) be
the vector containing measure c(a) for each cell a of each cuboid in L. Fall has sensitivity
|L| (Definition 2.1.2), since a row in T contributes 1 to exactly one cell in each cuboid
in L. Note that |L| = 2d if all the cuboids are to be published. By Theorem 2.1.1, to
preserve ²-differential privacy, Kall adds noise drawn from Lap(|L|/²) to each cell–c˜(a) =
c(a)+Lap(|L|/²)–and publishes the resulting vector. The noise variance in Kall is high. With
8 dimensions, |L| can reach 28, making the mean squared error reach Var [c˜(a)] = 2 · 216/²2.
Some approaches in [5] and [80] can be adapted in our context with the same asymptotic
error bound (e.g., Theorem 3 in [80]) as Kall’s error bound, which is shown below.
Theorem 3.2.1 Kall is ²-differentially private. For any cell a to be published, c˜(a) is unbi-
ased: E [c˜(a)] = c(a), and the mean squared error of c˜(a) is Var [c˜(a)] = 2|L|2/²2.
Proof: Adding/deleting a row in T affects the measure c(a) of exactly one cell in each
cuboids by 1. The vector Fall(T ), with each entry as c(a) for each cell of each cuboid in
L, has sensitivity S(Fall) = |L|. By Theorem 2.1.1, Kall is ²-differentially private. Since the
noise is generated from Lap(|L|/²), we have E [c˜(a)] = c(a), Var [c˜(a)] = 2|L|/²2. 2
Another option, Kbase, computes only the cells in the d-dim cuboid, i.e., the base cuboid,
directly from T , and insert Laplace noise into them. Kbase computes the measures of the
remaining cells to be released by aggregating the noisy measures of the base cells. The
vector Fbase(T ) has each entry as the measure c(a) of a cell in the base cuboid, and thus
its sensitivity is 1; therefore, publishing c˜(a) = c(a) + Lap(1/²) for each base cell preserves
²-differential privacy. When Kbase computes higher-level cuboids from Fbase(T ), we do not
touch T , so ²-differential privacy is preserved. However, the noise variance grows quickly as
we aggregate more base cells to compute cells in higher levels, as shown below.
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Figure 3.1: Lattice of cuboids and variance magnification of noise
Theorem 3.2.2 Kbase is ²-differentially private. For any published cell a, E [c˜(a)] = c(a). If
a is in a cuboid with dimensions [C], the mean squared error is Var [c˜(a)] = 2
∏
Aj /∈[C] |Aj|/²2.
Proof: Since only the base cuboid is computed from T , the sensitivity S(Fbase) = 1. So
from Theorem 2.1.1, publishing Fbase(T )+ 〈Lap(1/²)〉 satisfies ²-differential privacy. For any
other cell a not in the base cuboid, the computation of c˜(a) takes the released base cuboid
as input, so from the composition property [59], is ²-differentially private. For a cell a in the
base cuboid, E [c˜(a)] = E [c(a) + Lap(1/²)] = c(a), and Var [c˜(a)] = 2/²2. For a cell a in a
cuboid C, it aggregates a set {a′} of ∏Aj /∈[C] |Aj| cells in the base cuboid. So we have
E [c˜(a)] = E
[∑
a′
c˜(a′)
]
=
∑
a′
E [c˜(a′)] =
∑
a′
c(a′) = c(a),
and since noise is generated independently,
Var [c˜(a)] = Var
[∑
a′
c˜(a′)
]
=
∑
a′
Var [c˜(a′)] =
 ∏
Aj /∈[C]
|Aj|
 · 2/²2.
2
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Example 3.2.1 For the fact table T in Figure 1.1(a), Figure 3.1(a) shows the lattice of
cuboids under the relationship ¹. Three dimensions Sex, Age, and Salary have cardinality 2,
7, and 5, respectively. Each cuboid is labeled as Cx1x2x3, where xi = 1 iff the i
th dimension is
in this cuboid. For example, C011 is the cuboid {Age, Salary}. The label on an edge from C to
C ′ in Figure 3.1(b) is the variance magnification ratio when cells in cuboid C are aggregated
to compute the cells in C ′. For example, if C011 is computed from C111, the noise variance
doubles, since the dimension Sex has 2 distinct values–each cell in C011 is the aggregation of
2 cells in C111. If C001 is computed from C111, the noise variance is magnified 2 × 7 = 14
times, since 14 cells in C111 form one in C001.
Suppose we want to publish all the cuboids in Figure 3.1(a). Using Kall, we add Laplace
noise Lap(8/²) to each cell, giving noise variance 2 × 64/²2 = 128/²2 for one cell. Using
Kbase, we add Laplace noise Lap(1/²) to each cell in C111 and then aggregate its cells. Each
cell in C100 is built from 7× 5 cells in C111, with noise variance 35× 2/²2 = 70/²2. A cell in
C000 is built from 7× 5× 2 cells in C111, with noise variance 70× 2/²2 = 140/²2.
A better approach is to compute cuboids C111, C110, C101, and C100 from T , adding Laplace
noise Lap(4/²) to each (the sensitivity is 4). We compute the other cuboids from these, which
does not violate differential privacy as we do not touch the fact table. Then the noise variance
in C100 is 32/²
2 and in C000 is 2× 32/²2 = 64/²2 (aggregating 2 cells of C100).
Example 3.2.1 shows that the more initial cuboids we compute from the table T , the
higher their sensitivity is (more noise), but the less noise is accumulated when other cuboids
are computed from them. Kall and Kbase are the two extremes of computing as many or as
few cuboids as possible directly from T . There is some strategy between Kall and Kbase that
gives better bounds for the noise variance of released cuboids. There are two intuitive ideas:
the first is to vary the set of initial cuboids (C111, C110, C101, and C100 in Example 3.2.1); and
the second is more general: we can vary the amounts of noise inserted into different initial
cuboids. These two ideas will be elaborated in the rest of Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
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3.2.1 Noise Control Framework: Cuboid Selection
We first introduce the framework of a better algorithm Kpart in this subsection. To publish
a set L ⊆ Lall of cuboids, Kpart chooses which cuboids, denoted as Lpre, to compute directly
from the fact table T , in a manner that reduces the overall noise. Lpost = L − Lpre includes
all the other cuboids in L. We do not require Lpre ⊆ L. Kpart works as follows.
1. (Noise Sources) For each cell a of cuboids in Lpre, Kpart computes c(a) from T but
releases c˜(a) = c(a)+Lap(s/²), where the sensitivity s = |Lpre|. Lpre is selected by our
algorithms in Section 3.2.2 s.t. all cuboids in L can be computed from Lpre.
2. (Aggregation) For each cuboid C ∈ Lpost, Kpart selects a descendant cuboid C∗ from
Lpre s.t. C∗ º C, and computes c˜(a) for each cell a ∈ C by aggregating the noisy
measure of cells in C∗. We discuss how to pick C∗ as follows.
The measure c˜(a) output by Kpart is an unbiased estimator of c(a) for every cell a,
i.e., E [c˜(a)] = c(a). For a cell a in cuboid C ′ ∈ Lpre, Var [c˜(a)] = 2s2/²2 (s = |Lpre|).
Suppose cell a in C ∈ Lpost is computed from C ′ ∈ Lpre by aggregating on dimensions
[C ′]− [C] = {Ak1 , . . . , Akq}, the variance magnification is defined as
mag(C,C ′) =
∏
1≤i≤q
|Aki|. (3.1)
So the noise variance, the mean squared error, of c˜(a) is
Var [c˜(a)] = mag(C,C ′) · 2s2/²2. (3.2)
Let mag(C,C) = 1. If C cannot be computed from C ′, let mag(C,C ′) = ∞. We should
compute the cells in C ∈ Lpost from the (nearest) cuboid C∗ ∈ Lpre for which mag(C,C∗) is
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minimal, i.e., mag(C,C∗) = minC′∈Lpre mag(C,C
′). Let
noise(C,Lpre) = min
C′∈Lpre
mag(C,C ′) · 2s2/²2 (3.3)
be the smallest possible noise variance when computing C from a single cuboid in the selected
cuboid set Lpre. In a special case, if C ′ ∈ Lpre, noise(C ′,Lpre) = 2s2/²2.
Theorem 3.2.3 Kpart is ²-differentially private. For any released cell a, E [c˜(a)] = c(a).
Proof: The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 3.2.2. Consider the measures 〈c(a)〉 for
all cells in the s selected cuboids in Lpre, the sensitivity of publishing Lpre is s = |Lpre| (since
the measure of exactly one cell in each cuboid in Lpre is changed by ±1 if adding/deleting a
row in T ). So by Theorem 2.1.1 and the composition property of differential privacy, adding
a noise Lap(s/²) to each cell in Lpre and computing L from Lpre is ²-differentially private.
E [c˜(a)] = c(a) is also from the linearity of expectation. 2
Example 3.2.2 Consider the data cube in Example 2.1.1 and release algorithm Kpart with
Lpre = {C111, C110, C101, C100}. C000 can be computed from C100 with noise variance 2×32/²2,
since mag(C000, C100) = 2; or from C110 with noise variance 14 × 32/²2 = 448/²2, since
mag(C000, C110) = 2 × 7 = 14. So Kpart chooses the best among all cuboids in Lpre, and
computes C000 from C100. And we have noise(C000,Lpre) = 64/²2.
Kpart shares some similarities to the matrix mechanism in [51]. Kpart chooses cuboids Lpre
to compute L, while [51] chooses a set of queries to answer a given workload of count queries.
If we adapt [51] for our problem by treating a cell as a count query, we need to manipulate
matrices of sizes equal to the number of cells (e.g., matrices with 106 × 106 entries for a
moderate data cube with 106 cells). So [51] is not directly applicable in our context.
Efficient Implementation of Kpart. Suppose Lpre is given. A naive way to compute
differentially private cuboids in L is to inject noise into each cuboid in Lpre. Then for each
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C ∈ L, query its nearest descendant C∗ ∈ Lpre, and aggregate cells in C∗ to compute C.
We can compute differentially private cuboids in Lmore efficiently with fewer cell queries.
Suppose C ¹ C ′′ ¹ C∗, noise is injected into C∗ ∈ Lpre for ensuring differential privacy,
and C ′′ is computed from C∗. Then computing C from C∗ is equivalent to computing
it from C ′′, with differential privacy ensured. So after noise is injected into all cuboids
in Lpre, differentially private cuboids in L can be computed in a level-by-level way, i.e.,
computing i-dim cuboids from (i + 1)-dim cuboids. The total running time is O(Nd2),
where N = Πj(|Aj|+ 1) is the total number of cells.
Cuboid selection problems: optimizing noise source Lpre
We formalize two versions of the problem of choosing Lpre with different goals, given table
T and set L of cuboids to be published.
Problem 1 (Bound Max) Choose a set Lpre of cuboids s.t. all cuboids in L can be com-
puted from Lpre and the max noise noise(Lpre) = maxC∈L noise(C,Lpre) is minimized.
Problem 2 (Publish Most) Given threshold θ0 and cuboid weighting w(·), choose Lpre s.t.∑
C∈L: noise(C,Lpre)≤θ0 w(C) is maximized. In other words, maximize the weight of the cuboids
computed from Lpre with noise variance no more than θ0.
Theorem 3.2.4 The two cuboid selection problems Bound Max and Publish Most are
both NP-hard, if we treat |L| as the input size.
Proof: To complete the proof, we reduce the problem of Vertex Cover in degree-3
graphs to the Bound Max problem. Then the hardness of Publish Most follows.
Construction of Instances. Following is an instance of the Vertex Cover problem in a
degree-3 graph (where the degree of a vertex is bounded by 3). Given a degree-3 (undirected)
graph G(V,E) where |V | = n, decide if G has a vertex cover V ′ ⊆ V with at most m (< n)
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vertices. V ′ ⊆ V is said to be a vertex cover of G iff for any edge uv ∈ E, we have either
u ∈ V ′ or v ∈ V ′. Abusing the notations a bit, let cov(v) be the edges incident on a vertex
v, then we want to decide if there is V ′ ⊆ V such that ∪v∈V ′cov(v) = E and |V ′| ≤ m.
We can assume the degree of any vertex in V is larger than 1, since a degree-1 vertex
will be never chosen into a minimum vertex cover. And since there is at least one vertex
with degree 3 (otherwise G can be decomposed into cycles which are the trivial case for the
Vertex Cover problem), we have |E| > 2n/2 = n.
Now we can construct an instance of the Bound Max problem from the above instance
of Vertex Cover problem, correspondingly:
(i) For each edge e ∈ E, create a dimension Ae with cardinality |Ae| = 2, and a 1-dim
cuboid [C1e ] = {Ae}.
(ii) Create 3n distinct dimensions B1, . . . , B3n, each of cardinality 2. For each of them,
create a 1-dim cuboid [C1i ] = {Bi} (not related to the graph).
(iii) For each vertex v ∈ V , create a 3-dim cuboid [C3v ] = {Ae1 , Ae2 , Ae3} for each edge ei
incident on v. Note that a vertex may have less than 3 edges incident on it; in this case,
we create one or two new distinct dimensions with cardinality 2, and include them in
[C3v ]. So we create n 3-dim cuboids here.
(iv) Create n 3-dim cuboids C3x’s: each cuboid [C
3
x] = {Bx1 , Bx2 , Bx3}, where each Bxi ’s are
distinct dimensions with cardinality 2 created in (ii) (not related to the graph).
(v) For each 3-dim cuboid, [C3v ] = {Ae1 , Ae2 , Ae3} or [C3x] = {Bx1 , Bx2 , Bx3}, create a
new dimension Dv or Dx, respectively, with cardinality 4, and a 4-dim cuboid [C
4
v ] =
{Ae1 , Ae2 , Ae3 , Dv} or [C4x] = {Bx1 , Bx2 , Bx3 , Dx}, respectively. So in total, we have 2n
4-dim cuboids created here.
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In this instance of Bound Max, we want to publish all the 1-dim, 3-dim, and 4-dim
cuboids in (i)-(v), denoted by L. And the questions is to decide if we can select a set of
cuboids Lpre such that the max noise variance in releasing L from Lpre using Kpart is at most
8(3n+m)2/²2, i.e., noise(Lpre) ≤ 8(3n+m)2/²2.
In the following part, we prove the Vertex Cover instance is YES if and only if the
Bound Max instance is YES, to complete our proof of the NP-hardness.
One Direction “⇒”
This direction is easy. If there is a vertex cover V ′ with size m, create Lpre as follows: We
select all the 2n 4-dim cuboids in (v) and all the n 3-dim cuboids in (iv) into Lpre. Among
3-dim cuboids in (iii), for each v in the vertex cover V ′, we select the cuboid C3v into Lpre. So
totally, we have 3n+m cuboids C in Lpre. We can prove for any cuboid in L, i.e., the ones (i)-
(v), we have mag(C,C ′) ≤ 4 for at lease one C ′ ∈ Lpre. For any other cuboid C3v in (iii) but
not in Lpre, we have a cuboid C4v ∈ Lpre in (v) covering C3v such that mag(C3v , C4v ) = 4, since
the dimension Dv has cardinality 4; for any cuboid C
1
i in (ii), we have a cuboid C
3
x ∈ Lpre in
(iv) covering C1i (i = x1, x2, or x3) such that mag(C
1
i , C
3
x) = 2× 2 = 4, since each dimension
Bi has cardinality 2; for any cuboid C
1
e in (i), since V
′ is a vertex cover, we have a cuboid
C3v (v ∈ V ′) such that C3v covers C1e and mag(C1e , C3v ) = 2× 2 = 4, since each dimension Ae
has cardinality 2. Since |Lpre| = 3n +m, we add a random noise Lap((3n +m)/²) to each
cell of a cuboid in Lpre. So, noise(Lpre) ≤ 4 · 2(3n+m)2/²2 = 8(3n+m)2/²2.
The Other Direction “⇐”
Now we prove: If there is a set Lpre of cuboids such that cuboids in L can be com-
puted from Lpre and noise(Lpre) ≤ 8(3n +m)2/²2, there is a vertex cover V ′ in G such that
|V ′| ≤ m < n. Define mag(C,Lpre) = minC′∈Lpre mag(C,C ′) to be the minimum variance mag-
nification ratio if C can be computed from some cuboid in Lpre. Define mag(C,Lpre) =∞ if
C cannot be computed from Lpre. Then noise(Lpre) = maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) · 2|Lpre|2/²2.
Structure analysis.
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To prepare for case analysis below, we want prove a collection of structural results like:
“for any two 4-dim cuboids C4u and C
4
v in (v), if a cuboid C
′ covers both C4u and C
4
v , we must
have mag(C4u, C
′), mag(C4v , C
′) ≥ 16.” For any two 4-dim cuboids C4u and C4v with u, v ∈ V
in (v), we must have the intersection of their dimensions [C4u] ∩ [C4v ] contains at most one
dimension, since two vertices u and v in G have at most one common edge (if either u or v is
not in V , the intersection is empty). So for a cuboid C ′ covering both C4u and C
4
v (e.g. [C
′] =
[C4u] ∪ [C4v ]), C ′ must have at least 7 dimensions. Moreover, mag(C4u, C ′),mag(C4v , C ′) ≥
22 ·41 = 16, because C ′ has 5 dimensions with cardinality 2 and 2 dimensions with cardinality
4 while C4u or C
4
v has 3 dimensions with cardinality 2 and 1 dimension with cardinality 4.
Similarly, for any two 3-dim cuboids C3u and C
3
v in (iii), a cuboid C
′ covering both of
them must have mag(C3u, C
′), mag(C3v , C
′) ≥ 4. For any two 3-dim cuboids C3x and C3y in
(iv), a cuboid C ′ covering both of them must have mag(C3x, C
′), mag(C3y , C
′) ≥ 8.
Case analysis of maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre).
The goal of the case analysis is to show that, if either maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) < 4 or > 4,
it is impossible to select Lpre with noise(Lpre) ≤ 8(3n+m)2/²2.
1) If maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) = 1, all cuboids in L have to be selected into Lpre. There are
|E| (> n) 1-dim cuboids in (i), 3n 1-dim cuboids in (ii), n 3-dim cuboids in (iii), n 3-dim
cuboids in (iv), 2n 4-dim cuboids in (v). There are a total of |E| + 7n (> 8n) cuboids in
(i)-(v). So noise(Lpre) > 2(8n)2/²2 > 8(3n+m)2/²2.
2) If maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) = 2: From the structure discussion, all the 2n 3-dim cuboids C
in (iii) and (iv) and all the 2n 4-dim cuboids C in (v) must be selected into Lpre, since there
is no cuboid C ′ covering two of them with mag(C,C ′) ≤ 4. To cover all the 1-dim cuboids
in (i), we need at least n 2-dim cuboids (in the best case, their dimensions are disjoint). To
cover all the 1-dim cuboids in (ii), we need at least 2n 2-dim cuboids to be in Lpre. So we
have |Lpre| ≥ 6n, and thus noise(Lpre) ≥ 2 · 2(6n)2/²2 = 144n2/²2 > 8(3n+m)2/²2.
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3) If maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) = 4: All 2n 4-dim cuboids in (v) must be selected into Lpre.
We will not choose to use any 2-dim cuboid to cover a 1-dim cuboid in (i)-(ii), since a 3-
dim cuboid in (iii) or (iv) covers more. For a similar reason, we will not choose any 3-dim
cuboid other than the ones in (iii) and (iv). For any 1-dim cuboid in (i) or (ii), we need
to select either itself into Lpre or some 3-dim cuboid in (iii) or (iv) into Lpre to cover it;
to minimize |Lpre| (and thus noise(Lpre)), we always select 3-dim cuboids in (iii) and (iv)
into Lpre. The n 3-dim cuboids in (iv) must be all selected into Lpre to cover the 3n 1-
dim cuboids in (ii). Suppose m′ (≤ n) cuboids from (iii) are selected to cover all 1-dim
cuboids in (i), these m′ cuboids corresponds to a vertex cover V ′ for G (|V ′| = m′), and
noise(Lpre) = 4 · 2|Lpre|2/²2 = 8(3n+m′)2/²2.
4) If maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) = 8: Again, all 2n 4-dim cuboids in (v) must be selected
into Lpre. There are totally at least 4n 1-dim cuboids uncovered by them in (i) and (ii); to
cover all of them, we need at least n 4-dim cuboids to be in Lpre. Therefore, noise(Lpre) ≥
8 · 2(3n)2/²2 = 144n2²2 > 8(3n+m)2/²2.
5) If maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) = 16: We can choose Lpre to be the set of all 2n 4-dim cuboids
in (v) to cover L; however, as m < n, we have noise(Lpre) > 8(3n+m)2/²2. Choosing a 7-dim
cuboid to cover two 4-dim cuboids and discarding the two 4-dim ones does not help, since it
leaves at least two 3-dim cuboids uncovered. So we still have noise(Lpre) > 8(3n+m)2/²2.
6) If maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) ≥ 32: We have |Lpre| <
√
2n, since otherwise noise(Lpre) >
8(3n+m)2/²2. The idea is similar to the above case “maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) = 16”. To cover
the 2n 4-dim cuboids in (v) with fewer than
√
2n cuboids, we have to choose some 7-dim
cuboids or 8-dim cuboids, but it leaves more 3-dim and 1-dim cuboids uncovered, which
could not help reduce noise(Lpre).
Any case with maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) valued between two cases k) and k+1) above can be
analyzed in the same way as case k).
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From the above case analysis, if there is a set of cuboids Lpre such that cuboids in L can be
computed from Lpre and noise(Lpre) ≤ 8(3n+m)2/²2, the only case is “maxC∈Lmag(C,Lpre) =
4”. So we have m′ ≤ m, implying there is a vertex cover in G with |V ′| ≤ m.
The two directions “⇒” and “⇐” completes our proof. 2
Remark. The main difficulty in the reduction is the lattice structure of cuboids. And,
how to prove/disprove the NP-hardness when the number of dimensions d is bounded (d =
O(log |L|)) and how to prove the hardness of approximation are still open.
Note that Kall and Kbase are special cases of Kpart by letting Lpre = L and Lpre =
{the base cuboid}, respectively. We will introduce two algorithms that choose Lpre care-
fully so that Kpart is better than Kall and Kbase w.r.t. objectives in Problems 1 and 2.
3.2.2 Optimization Algorithms for Cuboid Selection
A brute force approach for cuboid selection Problems 1 and 2–enumerating all possible
choices of Lpre (all possible cuboid subsets)–takes O(22d) time, which is not practical even for
d = 5. Due to the hardness result in Theorem 3.2.4, we introduce approximation algorithms
for these two problems, with running time polynomial in 2d.
Bounding the Maximum Variance
We now present a (ln(|L|) + 1)2-approximation algorithm for the Bound Max problem,
with running time polynomial in |L| and 2d. First, suppose we have an efficient algorithm
Feasible for subproblem Feasibility(L, θ, s): for a fixed θ and s, is there a set of s cuboids
Lpre s.t. for all C ∈ L, noise(C,Lpre) ≤ θ? Let Feasible(L, θ, s) return Lpre if a solution
exists, and “NO” otherwise. Then to solve Problem 1, we can find the minimum θ such that
for some s, Feasible(L, θ, s) returns a feasible solution. This θ can be found using binary
search instead of guessing all possible values. Algorithm 1 provides the details.
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1: θL ← 0, θR ← 2|L|2/²2 (or θR ← 2 · 4d/²2 if |L| = 2d);
2: while |θL − θR| > 1/²2 do
3: θ ← (θL + θR)/2;
4: if Feasible(L, θ, s) = NO for all s = 1, . . . , |L| then θL ← θ; else θR ← θ;
5: return θ∗ = θR and the solution found by Feasible(L, θ∗, s).
Feasible(L, θ, s)
6: Compute coverage cov(C) for each cuboid based on θ and s;
7: R ← ∅, COV ← ∅;
8: repeat the following two steps s times
9: Select a cuboid C ′ such that |cov(C ′)− COV| is maximized
10: R← R∪ {C ′}, COV ← COV ∪ cov(C ′);
11: if COV = L then return R as Lpre; else return NO.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Bound Max problem
Theorem 3.2.4 says that Bound Max Variance is NP-hard, so there cannot be an
efficient exact algorithm for the subproblem Feasibility. We provide a greedy algorithm
(analogous to that for Set Cover) that achieves the promised approximation guarantee
(ln |L|+ 1)2 for the Bound Max Variance problem.
Using (3.3), we rewrite Feasibility’s noise constraint as:
noise(C,Lpre) ≤ θ ⇔ min
C′∈Lpre
mag(C,C ′) ≤ θ²2
2s2
. (3.4)
For fixed θ, ², and s, cuboid C ′ covers cuboid C if C ¹ C ′ and mag(C,C ′) ≤ θ²2
2s2
. Define
C ′’s coverage to be:
cov(C ′, θ, ², s) = {C ∈ L | C ¹ C ′, mag(C,C ′) ≤ θ²2
2s2
}. (3.5)
For simplicity, we write cov(C ′) for cov(C ′, θ, ², s) when θ, ², and s are fixed.
Lemma 3.2.5 noise(C,Lpre) ≤ θ ⇔ there exists C ′ ∈ Lpre s.t. C ∈ cov(C ′, θ, ², |Lpre|).
Proof: The proof is simply from the definition: Let s = |Lpre|. If noise(C,Lpre) ≤ θ, from
Equation (3.3), there is a C ′ ∈ Lpre such that mag(C,C ′) ≤ (θ²2)/(2s2). And thus from
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Equation (3.5), C ∈ cov(C ′, θ, ², s). The converse direction is similar. 2
By Lemma 3.2.5, Feasibility(L, θ, s) reduces to finding s cuboids that cover all cuboids
in L. To solve this problem, we employ the greedy algorithm for the Set Cover problem:
in each of s iterations, we add to Lpre the cuboid that covers the maximum number of not-
yet-covered members of L. The greedy algorithm can find at most (ln |L| + 1)s∗ cuboids
to cover all cuboids in L if the minimum covering set has size at least s∗. This algorithm,
denoted as Feasible(L, θ, s), appears in lines 6-11 of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3.2.6 Algorithm 1 finds an (ln |L| + 1)2-approximation to Problem 1 (Bound
Max) in O(min{3d, 2d|L|}|L| log |L|) time. Using the solution Lpre produced by Algorithm 1,
Kpart is at least as good as Kall and Kbase, in terms of the objective in Problem 1.
Proof: The results are proved one by one as follows.
Approximation Ratio. Suppose the optimal solution is θ∗, i.e., there are s∗ cuboids Lpre
s.t. for any C ∈ L, noise(C,Lpre) ≤ θ∗. From Lemma 3.2.5, equivalently, there are s∗ cuboids
C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
s∗ s.t.
⋃s∗
i=1 cov(C
∗
i , θ
∗, ², s∗) = L. And, from the definition (3.5),
∀ cuboid C and α : cov(C, α2θ∗, ², αs∗) = cov(C, θ∗, ², s∗).
Suppose in line 4 of Algorithm 1, we have θ = α2θ∗ and s = αs∗. In the following part,
we will prove when α = ln(|L|) + 1, the algorithm Feasible(L, θ, s) can find s cuboids
C ′1, . . . , C
′
s, s.t.
⋃s
i=1 cov(C
′
i, θ, ², s) = L, which implies that, with Lpre = {C ′1, . . . , C ′s},
maxC∈L noise(C,Lpre) ≤ θ = α2θ∗. So we can conclude that Algorithm 1 finds an (ln(|L|) +
1)2-approximation. Since for any cuboid C, cov(C, θ, ², s) = cov(C, θ∗, ², s∗) for the selection
of θ and s above, we write both of them as cov(C). Now we only need to prove: if there
exists s∗ cuboids C∗1 , . . . , C
∗
s∗ such that
⋃s∗
i=1 cov(C
∗
i ) = L, the algorithm Feasible finds
s = αs∗ cuboids C ′1, . . . , C
′
s (in this order) s.t.
⋃s
i=1 cov(C
′
i) = L.
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We apply the analysis of the greedy Set Cover algorithm here to complete the proof.
Let li be the number of cuboids in L uncovered by {C ′1, C ′2, . . . , C ′i}. Define l0 = |L|. It
is easy to see li ≤ (1 − 1/s∗)li−1, since every iteration we choose C ′, which covers the most
uncovered cuboids in L ({C∗1 , . . . , C∗s∗} also cover these uncovered cuboids, so the selected
C ′ covers no less than any of them). So li ≤ (1− 1/s∗)i|L|. When i ≥ (ln |L|+ 1)s∗, li < 1.
Therefore, Feasible finds at most s = (ln |L|+ 1)s∗ cuboids covering L.
Comparison to Kall and Kbase. Kall and Kbase are two special cases of Kpart with Lpre = L
and Lpre = {the base cuboid}, respectively. Let θall and θbase be the max noise in L for these
two choices of Lpre respectively. It is not hard to see, both when θ = θall and s = |L|, and
when θ = θbase and s = 1, Feasible will return a solution. So the one found and returned
by Algorithm 1 is at least as good, in terms of the objective in Problem 1.
Time Complexity. If for some θ, the algorithm Feasible returns a feasible solution for
some s, then for any θ′ ≥ θ, it also returns a feasible solution for some s′. So from the above
comparison to Kall, we can use θR = θall = 2|L|2/²2 as upper bound and apply binary search
to find the minimum “feasible” θ. Also, it is not hard to see for any two different cuboid sets
Lpre and Lpre′, we have either noise(Lpre) = noise(Lpre′) or |noise(Lpre)− noise(Lpre′)| ≥ 1/²2,
for mag(C,C ′) is always an integer for any two cuboids C and C ′. So we can stop when
|θL − θR| ≤ 1/²2. So, overall, lines 2-4 in Algorithm 1 repeats at most O(log(|L|)) times.
In each iteration of lines 2-4, the algorithm Feasible is called |L| times. Similar to the
Set Cover greedy algorithm, using a linked list of cuboids ordered by their coverage, a
standard implementation of Feasible needs O(
∑
all cuboids C |cov(C)|) time.
The running time
∑
C |cov(C)| of Feasible is bounded in two ways: i) There are a
total of 2d cuboids C and each |cov(C)| ≤ |L|. ii) For a k-dim cuboid C, |cov(C)| ≤ 2k; so∑
C |cov(C)| ≤
∑d
k=0
(
d
k
)
2k = 3d. So we have
∑
C |cov(C)| ≤ min{3d, 2d|L|}. Therefore, the
overall running time of Algorithm 1 is O(min{3d, 2d|L|}|L| log |L|). 2
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Example 3.2.3 Suppose we want to publish all cuboids in Figure 3.1(a) (L = Lall) . When
Feasible(·) is called with θ = 80/²2 and s = 2, from (3.5), C ′ covers C iff C ¹ C ′ and
mag(C,C ′) ≤ 10. mag(C,C ′) can be computed from Figure 3.1(b) by multiplying the edge
weights on the path from C ′ to C. In the first iteration of lines 8-10, Algorithm 1 chooses
C111 for cov(C111) = {C111, C110, C010, C101, C011} covers the most cuboids in L, and puts
C111 into R. In the second iteration, Algorithm 1 chooses C101 because cov(C101) = {C101,
C100, C001, C000} which covers three (the most) cuboids not covered by C111 yet. C111 and
C101 cover all the cuboids, so Feasible(·) returns Lpre = {C111, C101}.
The binary search in Algorithm 1 determines that 64/²2 is the smallest value of θ for
which Feasible finds a feasible Lpre for some s. In that iteration, for s = 4, Feasible
returns Lpre = {C111, C110, C101, C100}. There, we have cov(C111) = {C111, C011}, cov(C110)
= {C110, C010}, cov(C101) = {C101, C001}, and cov(C100) = {C100, C000}.
Algorithm 1’s running time is polynomial in 2d and |L|, and it provides a logarithmic
approximation. Note that d is not very large in practice, but |L| can be as large as 2d.
Publishing as Many as Possible
We now present a (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm for the Publish Most problem, with
running time polynomial in |L| and 2d. Given threshold θ0, assuming the optimal solution
has s cuboids, from Lemma 3.2.5, Publish Most is equivalent to finding a set of s cuboids
Lpre s.t. the weighted sum of the cuboids in L that they cover (with θ = θ0 and the fixed s)
is as high as possible. We will consider values up to |L| for s, and apply the greedy algorithm
for the Maximum Coverage problem for each choice of s.
As outlined in Algorithm 2, initially R and COV are empty. In each iteration, we find
the cuboid for which the total weight of the not-previously-covered cuboids it covers in L is
maximal. We put this cuboid into R and put the newly covered cuboids into COV . After
repeating this s times, |R| = s and COV is the set of cuboids with noise variance no more
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than θ0 if computed from R. At the end, pick the best R over all choices of s as Lpre. If
some cuboids in L cannot be computed from Lpre but we desire to publish them, we can
simply add one more cuboid, the base cuboid, into Lpre.
1: for s = 1, 2, . . . , |L| do Rs ← GreedyCover(L, θ0, s);
2: return the best Rs as Lpre;
GreedyCover(L, θ0, s)
3: Compute coverage cov(C) for each cuboid based on θ0 and s;
4: R ← ∅, COV ← ∅;
5: repeat the following steps s times
6: Select a cuboid C ′ such that |cov(C ′)− COV| is maximized
(or
∑
C∈cov(C′)−COV w(C) is maximized)
7: R← R∪ {C ′}, COV ← COV ∪ cov(C ′);
8: return R.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for Publish Most problem
Theorem 3.2.7 Algorithm 2 finds a (1−1/e)-approximation to Problem 2 (Publish Most)
in O(min{3d, 2d|L|}d|L|) time. Moreover, using the solution Lpre produced by Algorithm 2,
Kpart is as least as good as Kall and Kbase, in terms of the objective in Problem 2.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the one for Theorem 3.2.6:
Approximation Ratio. Suppose the optimal solution is to select s∗ cuboids C∗1 , C
∗
2 , . . . , C
∗
s∗
as Lpre such that the number of covered cuboids |
⋃s∗
i=1 cov(C
∗
i , θ0, ², s
∗)| = OPT is maximized.
Of course, s∗ ≤ |L|. When s = s∗ in line 2 of Algorithm 2, GreedyCover(L, θ0, s∗) is
called. To prove the promised approximation ratio, we only need to prove GreedyCover
will select s∗ cuboids C ′1, C
′
2, . . . , C
′
s∗ (in this order) as Lpre such that
|
s∗⋃
i=1
cov(C ′i, θ0, ², s
∗)| ≥ (1− 1/e)OPT.
The proof for this is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.2.6. Using the same
notations (li is the number of cuboids in L covered by C∗1 , . . . , C∗s∗ but not covered by
C ′1, . . . , C
′
i), we have ls∗ ≤ (1 − 1/s∗)s∗OPT ≤ OPT/e. So the number of cuboids in L
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covered by {C ′1, . . . , C ′s∗} is at least (1−1/e)OPT. The weight version (maximize the weight
of cuboids covered by Lpre) is very similar to the above. So we omit it here.
Comparison to Kall and Kbase. Similarly, the solution offered by Kall and Kbase is achieved
by Algorithm 2 when s = |L| and 1, respectively. So the final solution output by Algorithm 2
is at least as good, in terms of the objective in Problem 2.
Time Complexity. Selecting more than |L| cuboids into Lpre does not help, since selecting
Lpre = L is a better solution than that. So we only consider s from 1 up to |L|. Similar
to Feasible, GreedyCover can be implemented in O(min{3d, 2d|L|}) time. For the
weighted version, an additional factor O(log(2d)) = O(d) is needed since we need to maintain
a priority queue for all cuboids. So the overall running time is O(min{3d, 2d|L|}d|L|). 2
In practice, we can also use Algorithm 2 to publish all of L when that is possible.
As shown in the experiments, instead of bounding the max noise as Algorithm 1 does,
Algorithm 2 tends to bound the average noise. There is no formal guarantee for this, but
the situation in experiments is: when the threshold in Problem 2 is set to be lower than
the solution found in Problem 1 (max variance when publishing all cuboids in L), a large
portion of cuboids can still have variance lower than this threshold, but only a few cuboids
exceed this threshold; and thus, the average of noise variance is lower.
Example 3.2.4 Consider the effect of Algorithm 2 on Example 3.2.3, with θ0 = 40/²
2 and
all cuboids to be published with equal weights. In the iteration of s = 2, when we call the
subroutine GreedyCover(L, 40/²2, 2), {C111, C101} is returned as R in line 8. Since no
other value of s covers more cuboids, {C111, C101} is finally returned as Lpre.
3.3 Optimizing Noise by Distribution Tuning
A possible generalization of our cuboid selection framework Kpart is: for different selected
cuboids in Lpre, we add different amounts of noise to further optimize the goals in Problems 1
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and 2. Suppose Lpre = {C1, C2, . . . , Cs} and noise Lap(λi/²) is injected to each cell in Ci,
from the composition property of differential [59], we claim that, if
∑s
i=1 1/λi = 1, the
publishing of Lpre is ²-differentially private. We will introduce this generalized framework
for optimizing noise in Section 3.3.1. Finding the optimal Lpre and parameters 〈λi〉 is hard,
but we will present efficient algorithms to find approximate solutions in Section 3.3.2.
Intuitively, ² can be interpreted as the privacy budget, which can be spent on different
cuboids to achieve the objective of, e.g., minimizing the max noise in the released cuboids.
In Kpart, ² is spent uniformly on selected cuboids; and in Kgen, we relax this constraint and
allow to spend different amounts of privacy budget on different cuboids.
Example 3.3.1 (Continuing Example 3.2.1) In this example, we want to demonstrate that
spending different amounts of privacy budget on different cuboids indeed yields better solu-
tions. Consider again the fact table T in Figure 1.1(a), with three dimensions Sex, Age, and
Salary which have cardinality 2, 7, and 5, respectively, and its cuboids in Figure 3.1(a).
Following the same notations as Example 3.2.1, we compute C111 and C100 from T . We
add Laplace noise Lap(1.375/²) to C111, and Lap(3.666/²) to C100. As 1/1.375+1/3.666 = 1,
²-differential privacy is preserved (we will formalize it later). We compute other cuboids from
these two noisy cuboids: for each other cuboid, we select the best of C111 and C100 to compute
it, which does not violate differential privacy as we do not touch the fact table. When we
compute C000, we select to compute it from C100 and the noise variance is 2×(2×3.6662/²2) =
53.758/²2 (aggregating 2 cells of C100). It is the max noise variance among all cuboids, and
is better than the approaches in Example 3.2.1 (Kall, Kbase, and Kpart).
3.3.1 A Generalized Framework: Distribution Selection
To publish a set L ⊆ Lall of cuboids, Kgen chooses to compute cuboids Lpre directly from the
fact table T , and then adds noise Lap(λC/²) to cells in C ∈ Lpre. Lpost = L − Lpre includes
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all the other cuboids in L. Again, we do not require Lpre ⊆ L. Kgen works as follows.
1. (Noise Sources) For each cell a in cuboid C ∈ Lpre, Kgen computes c(a) from T but
releases c˜(a) = c(a) + Lap(λC/²). Both Lpre and noise parameters {λC | C ∈ Lpre} are
selected by our algorithms in Section 3.3.2 s.t. L can be computed from Lpre.
2. (Aggregation) For each cuboid C ∈ Lpost, Kgen selects a descendant cuboid C∗ from Lpre
s.t. C∗ º C, and computes c˜(a) for each cell a ∈ C by aggregating the noisy measure
of cells in C∗. We discuss how to pick C∗ as follows.
The measure c˜(a) output by Kgen is an unbiased estimator of c(a) for every cell a.
We use σ2a to denote the noise variance of a cell a. For each cell a in a cuboid C
′ ∈ Lpre,
σ2a = Var [c˜(a)] = 2λ
2
C′/²
2. (3.6)
Suppose cell a in C ∈ Lpost is computed from C ′ ∈ Lpre by aggregating on dimensions
[C ′]− [C] = {Ak1 , . . . , Akq}, recall the variance magnification is defined as
mag(C,C ′) =
∏
1≤i≤q
|Aki|. (3.7)
So the noise variance, the mean squared error, of c˜(a) is
Var [c˜(a)] = mag(C,C ′) · 2λ2C′/²2. (3.8)
Similar to Kpart, we should compute the cells in C ∈ Lpost from the (nearest) cuboid
C∗ ∈ Lpre for which mag(C,C∗) · λ2C∗ is minimal (i.e. C∗ = argminC′∈Lpre mag(C,C ′) · λ2C′).
noise(C,Lpre) = min
C′∈Lpre
mag(C,C ′) · 2λ2C′/²2 (3.9)
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is the smallest possible noise variance when computing C from a single cuboid in the selected
cuboid set Lpre. In a special case, if C ′ ∈ Lpre, noise(C ′,Lpre) = 2λ2C′/²2.
Theorem 3.3.1 Kgen is ²-differentially private if
∑
C∈Lpre 1/λC = 1. For any released cell a
in L, c˜(a) is an unbiased estimator of c(a), i.e., E [c˜(a)] = c(a).
Proof: The first part can be proved using the composition property of differential privacy
(Theorem 2.1.3). And the second part is similar to Theorem 3.2.3. 2
Kgen can be also implemented similarly as Kpart. We do not repeat the discussion here.
Distribution selection problems: optimizing noise source Lpre and {λC}
Similar to Kpart, we formalize two versions of the problem of choosing Lpre and parameters
{λC} with different goals, given table T and set L of cuboids to be published.
Problem 3 (General Bound Max) Choose a set of cuboids Lpre and corresponding noise
parameters {λC | C ∈ Lpre} s.t.
∑
C∈Lpre 1/λC = 1, all cuboids in L can be computed from
Lpre, and the max noise noise(Lpre) = maxC∈L noise(C,Lpre) is minimized.
Problem 4 (General Publish Most) Given θ0 and cuboid weighting w(·), choose Lpre
and {λC} s.t.
∑
C∈Lpre 1/λC = 1 and
∑
C∈L: noise(C,Lpre)≤θ0 w(C) is maximized. In other words,
maximize the number (weight) of the cuboids in L with noise variance no more than θ0.
Theorem 3.3.2 The two cuboid selection problems General Bound Max and General
Publish Most are both NP-hard, if we treat |L| as the input size.
Proof: The proof of NP-hardness is similar to the one for Problems 1 and 2. 2
We also have the following assertion about the optimal solution to Problems 3 and 4.
Theorem 3.3.3 The optimal solutions to problems General Bound Max and General
Publish Most are at least as good as the optimal solutions to Bound Max and Publish
Most in terms of their objective functions, respectively.
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Proof: The conclusion follows simply because any feasible solution to problems Bound
Max and Publish Most are also feasible solutions to problems General Bound Max
and General Publish Most, respectively. 2
3.3.2 Selecting the Best Parameters of Noise
We now present algorithms for Problems 3-4 to choose Lpre and {λC}. They have the same
performance guarantee as the algorithms for Problems 1-2, but are even more efficient.
Bounding the Maximum Variance
We now present a (ln(|L|) + 1)2-approximation algorithm for the General Bound Max
problem, with running time polynomial in |L| and 2d. Let’s guess the optimal solution value θ
and consider the feasibility problem Feasibility(L, θ): for a fixed θ, is there a set of cuboids
Lpre and Laplace noise parameters {λC | C ∈ Lpre} s.t. for all C ∈ L, noise(C,Lpre) ≤ θ?
For each cuboid C ′, let’s order all the ∆(C ′) cuboids {C1, C2, . . . , C∆(C′)} that can be
computed from C ′ by the variance magnification ratio mag(·, C ′):
mag(C1, C
′) ≤ mag(C2, C ′) ≤ . . . ≤ mag(C∆(C′), C ′).
C is said to be covered by C ′ if C can be computed from C ′ with noise variance no more
than θ. Define ∆(C ′) coverage sets cov(C ′, 1), cov(C ′, 2), . . . , cov(C ′,∆(C ′)), where
cov(C ′, i) = {C1, C2, . . . , Ci}. (3.10)
Also define the thresholds of noise parameter associated with each set:
λ¯(C ′, i) =
√
θ²2
2
· 1√
mag(Ci, C ′)
. (3.11)
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Lemma 3.3.4 If Laplace noise Lap(λ/²) with λ = λ¯(C ′, i) defined above is injected into
each cell of cuboids C ′, then every cuboid in cov(C ′, i) can be computed from C ′ with noise
variance no more than θ. The statement is true for i = 1, 2, . . .∆(C ′).
Proof: If Lap(λ¯(C ′, i)/²) is injected into each cell of cuboids C ′, then a ∈ Ci can be computed
from C ′ with
Var [c˜(a)] = mag(Ci, C
′) · 2λ¯(C ′, i)2/²2 = θ.
Similarly, any of cuboids C1, C2, . . . , Ci can be computed with noise variance ≤ θ. 2
Now we reduce General Bound Max (Problem 3) to the Weighted Set Cover
problem in order to develop an efficient approximation algorithm for our problem. The
reduction needs to preserve the performance ratio. For any instance of Problem 3, let’s
construct the following instance of the Weighted Set Cover problem.
Problem 5 (Instance of Weighted Set Cover constructed from Problem 3) For any
instance of Problem 3, let’s define a collection of sets:
S = {cov(C ′, i) | C ′ ∈ Lall, 1 ≤ i ≤ ∆(C ′)}, (3.12)
and each set cov(C ′, i) is associated with weight:
weight(C ′, i) =
√
mag(Ci, C ′). (3.13)
The goal is to find a sub-collection S0 ⊆ S covering cuboids in L,
⋃
cov(C′,i)∈S∗ cov(C
′, i) = L,
such that the total weight of sets in S0,
∑
cov(C′,i)∈S0 weight(C
′, i), is minimized.
For reduction, let’s construct a one-to-one mapping between feasible solutions to an
instance of Problem 3 and feasible solutions to its corresponding instance of Problem 5.
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Lemma 3.3.5 For fixed ², there exists a feasible solution to Problem 5 with weight w if and
only if there exists a feasible solution to Problem 3 with max noise variance θ = 2w2/²2.
Proof: For Problem 3, we only consider such feasible solutions: if C ′ ∈ Lpre, we must have
λC′ = λ¯(C
′, i) that is defined in (3.11) for some i. Because if λ¯(C ′, i − 1) ≥ λC′ ≥ λ¯(C ′, i),
we can simply set λC′ = λ¯(C
′, i − 1), so that less privacy budget is used but C ′ can cover
the same set of cuboids (i.e. the same set of cuboids can be computed from C with noise
variance no more than θ). For Problem 5, we only consider such feasible solutions S0: if
cov(C ′, i) ∈ S0, there does not exist cov(C ′, j) ∈ S0 s.t. i 6= j. Because we must have
cov(C ′, i) ⊆ cov(C ′, j) or cov(C ′, j) ⊆ cov(C ′, i), so one of them is redundant.
Now we construct the one-to-one mapping as follows.
Consider any feasible solution S0 to Problem 5 with total weight w. Let’s construct
a feasible solution to Problem 3: for each cov(C ′, i) ∈ S0, include C ′ into Lpre, and let
λC′ = w/weight(C
′, i) = w/
√
mag(Ci, C ′). It is easy to verify that
∑
C′∈Lpre 1/λC′ = 1, so
such Lpre and {λC′} are a feasible solution to Problem 3. Also, if we let θ = 2w2/²2, then
λC′ = λ¯(C
′, i), and thus from Lemma 3.3.4, cuboids in cov(C ′, i) can be computed from C ′
with noise variance no more than θ. Since S0 is a set cover of L, any cuboid in L can be
computed from some cuboid in Lpre with noise variance no more then θ.
For another direction, consider any feasible solution Lpre and {λC′ = λ¯(C ′, i)} to Prob-
lem 3 with max noise variance θ. We can construct a feasible solution S0 to Problem 5 by
including cov(C ′, i) (with weight
√
mag(Ci, C ′)) into S0 for each C ′ ∈ Lpre. It is not hard to
verify that S0 is a set cover for L, and the total weight is w =
√
θ²2/2.
Is is not hard to see the above two mappings are identical, so they together form a
one-to-one mapping, and the conclusion of this lemma follows. 2
Corollary 3.3.6 Letting OPTGBM be the optimal solution to Problem 3 and OPTWSC be
the optimal solution to Problem 5, OPTGBM = 2OPT
2
WSC/²
2. And, for any α-approximation
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for Problem 5, we can construct an α2-approximation for Problem 3, and vice versa.
Proof: The conclusion is directly from Lemma 3.3.5. And the construction for the second
part is identical to the one-to-one mapping presented in the proof of Lemma 3.3.5. 2
We are ready to introduce our efficient approximation algorithm for Problem 3. The
basic idea is to solve the corresponding instance of Weighted Set Cover (Problem 5),
and transform the solution into a solution to Problem 3, as the one-to-one mapping in the
proof of Lemma 3.3.5. Its performance ratio follows from Corollary 3.3.6. The algorithm is
described in Algorithm 3. Lines 3-6 solves the Weighted Set Cover instance using the
greedy algorithm, and line 7 transforms it into a solution to Problem 3.
1: Compute coverage sets cov(C, i)’s for each cuboid C and 1 ≤ i ≤ ∆(C);
2: Each coverage set cov(C, i) is associated with weight(C, i) =
√
mag(Ci, C);
3: Lpre ← ∅, COV ← ∅, w ← 0;
4: repeat until COV = L
5: Select a coverage set cov(C ′, i) with C ′ /∈ Lpre maximizing
|cov(C ′, i)− COV|
weight(C ′, i)
=
|cov(C ′, i)− COV|√
mag(Ci, C ′)
;
6: Lpre ← Lpre ∪ {C ′}, COV ← COV ∪ cov(C ′, i), w ← w + weight(C ′, i);
7: for each cov(C ′, i) ∈ Lpre do λC′ = w/weight(C ′, i);
8: return Lpre and {λC}.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm for General Bound Max problem
Theorem 3.3.7 Algorithm 3 finds an (ln |L| + 1)2-approximation to Problem 3 in time
O(2d|L|2). Using Lpre and {λC} produced by Algorithm 3, Kgen is at least as good as Kpart
using Lpre produced by Algorithm 1, in terms of the max noise variance.
Proof: Lines 3-6 use the (ln |L|+ 1)-approximation algorithm [77] to solve the Weighted
Set Cover instance. Line 7 transforms the solution into a solution Lpre and {λC} to
Problem 3. From Corollary 3.3.6, it is an (ln |L|+ 1)2-approximation for Problem 3.
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In lines 1-2, we need O(2d |˙L| log |L|) time to construct coverage sets cov(C, i)’s and
weight(C, i)’s (for each cuboid, we needO(|L| log |L|) time to sort C1, C2, . . . , C∆(C) according
to mag(Ci, C)). Then a standard implementation of lines 3-6 (the greedy algorithm) needs
O(
∑
C,i |cov(C, i)|) time. A simple upper bound of
∑
C,i |cov(C, i)| is 2d|L|2, because there
are at most 2d|L| coverage sets cov(C, i)’s, each of which has size at most |L|. So the total
running time of Algorithm 3 is bounded by O(2d|L|2) (not a tight bound).
The search space of Algorithm 1 is actually a subspace of the search space of Algorithm 3.
So it is not surprising that the solution produced by Algorithm 3 is better. 2
Publishing as Many as Possible
We now revise Algorithm 3 to solve Problem 4 with provable performance guarantee.
1: Compute coverage sets cov(C, i)’s for each cuboid C and 1 ≤ i ≤ ∆(C);
2: Each coverage set cov(C, i) is associated with
weight(C, i) =
1
λ¯(C, i)
=
√
mag(Ci, C ′) ·
√
2
θ0²2
;
3: Lpre ← ∅, COV ← ∅, w ← 0;
4: repeat until w > 1
5: Select a coverage set cov(C ′, i) with C ′ /∈ Lpre maximizing
|cov(C ′, i)− COV|
weight(C ′, i)
=
|cov(C ′, i)− COV|√
mag(Ci, C ′)
·
√
θ0²2
2
;
6: Lpre ← Lpre ∪ {C ′}, COV ← COV ∪ cov(C ′, i), w ← w + weight(C ′, i);
7: for each cov(C ′, i) ∈ Lpre do λC′ = 1/weight(C ′, i);
8: return the better one of Lpre − {C0} and {C0} as Lpre, where C0 is the last one added
into Lpre in lines 4-6, with the Laplace noise parameters as {λC}.
Algorithm 4: Algorithm for General Publish Most problem
Similar to Algorithm 3, we consider an Budgeted Maximum Coverage instance
with S = {cov(C ′, i) | C ′ ∈ Lall, 1 ≤ i ≤ ∆(C ′)} as the collection of sets. As we have the
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knowledge about θ0, the upper bound of noise variance, in Problem 4, each set cov(C
′, i)
is associated with weight(C, i) = 1/λ¯(C, i). Lines 3-6 are almost identical to the greedy
algorithm in Algorithm 3, expect the termination condition. Line 8 excludes C0 from Lpre
to ensure that
∑
C∈Lpre λC ≤ 1. It is not hard to prove the following claim.
Theorem 3.3.8 Algorithm 4 finds a 1
4
(1−1/e)-approximation to Problem 4 in time O(2d|L|2).
Using Lpre and {λC} produced by Algorithm 4, Kgen is at least as good as Kpart using Lpre
produced by Algorithm 2, w.r.t. the number of precise cuboids (noise variance ≤ θ0).
Proof: The equivalence of Problem 4 and the Budgeted Maximum Coverage instance
is from Lemma 3.3.4. The approximation ratio is from a similar analysis [18, 46] for the
approximation ratio of a greedy algorithm for maximizing submodular function under a
budget constraint. The rest part is identical to the proof for Theorem 3.3.7. 2
Algorithm 4 can be easily generalized for the weighted version of Problem 4.
3.4 Extension of Optimization Framework
We introduce extensions of our approaches to handle relative errors and data cube measures
other than the count measure. We also discuss possible ways to handle larger data cubes.
3.4.1 Minimizing Relative Error
The amount of noise Kpart and Kgen add to differentially private cuboids is independent of
the number of rows and specific data in the fact table. Instead, the selection of Lpre and the
amount of noise depend {λC | C ∈ Lpre} only depends on which cuboids are to be published,
the number of dimensions, and their cardinalities. So our expected absolute error is fixed if
the structure of the fact table is fixed, no matter how many rows there are. This feature of
our approaches is also true in differentially private frameworks for different publishing tasks
50
[5, 40, 51, 80, 86, 85]. The implication is that the expected relative error cannot be bounded
in general. Because, with the expected absolute error fixed, some cells may have very small
values of the count measure (e.g., 1), while some have very large values (e.g., 103). The
advantage is, for a particular cell, it has less relative error if it aggregates more rows. To
bound the relative error, we introduce the following two extensions of our approaches.
Ratio-Minimization Approach
Since we want to minimize the relative error, one possible model could be: we first ask users
to specify their expectations on the noise variances in different cuboids to be released, and it
is our task to optimize the noise source so that the max ratio of the actual noise variances over
the users’ expectations is minimized. The noise variance users expect in low-level cuboids
or “important” cuboids may be lower than the noise variance they expect in high-level or
“unimportant” cuboids. In this model, we give users the freedom to determine which cuboids
are more important (and thus should be more precise with lower noise variance) based their
need in practice. To this end, we can apply the noise optimization framework Kgen, but we
need to revise the objective of choosing Lpre and parameters {λC | C ∈ Lpre} as follows.
Problem 6 (General Bound Max Ratio) Given the user expectations on noise vari-
ances VARC in each cuboid C ∈ L, choose a set of cuboids Lpre and corresponding noise
parameters {λC | C ∈ Lpre} s.t.
∑
C∈Lpre 1/λC = 1, all cuboids in L can be computed from
Lpre, and the max noise noise(Lpre) = maxC∈L noise(C,Lpre)/VARC is minimized.
In this problem, noise(C,Lpre)/VARC is the ratio between the actually noise variance and
users’ expectation on it. The goal is to minimize the max ratio. Our Algorithm 3 can be
revised to solve this problem: we only need to redefine mag′(Ci, C) = mag(Ci, C)/VARC ,
order cuboids based on it, and plug it into weight(C, i) (3.13) and Algorithm 3.
51
Estimation-Optimization Approach
Here is another way to generalize our approaches to bound relative error. As for any empty
cell (with c(a) = 0), any small error leads to infinite relative error, we define the relative
error in a cuboid C as an average of relative errors of cell measures:
Err(C) =
∑
a∈C E [(c˜(a)− c(a))2]∑
a∈C c(a)
2
=
Var [c˜(a)]∑
a∈C c(a)
2/|C| .
Borrowing ideas from [79] and [66], we divide the privacy budget into two parts ² = ²1 + ²2.
²1 is used to get an estimation L˜2 of
∑
a∈C c(a)
2 using Kall. Let
E˜rr(C) =
Var [c˜(a)]
L˜2/|C|
.
Then we can modify the goal of Problems 1 and 3 as minimizing maxC E˜rr(C), and the
definition of precise cuboids in Problems 2 and 4 as the ones with E˜rr(C) ≤ θ0. Algorithms 1-
4 can be also revised accordingly to handle the relative-error versions of Problems 1-4.
3.4.2 Extension to Other Measures
Our techniques for the count measure c can be extended to other two basic measures sum-
mation sum and average avg. sum can be considered as a generalized count measure, where
each row in the fact table is associated with a value instead of just 0-1. Compared to the
count measure c, the sensitivity of a publishing function for sum is magnified Λ times, where
Λ is the range of possible values for any individual fact table tuple. Thus our techniques
for the count measure c can be applied to sum, with the noise variance magnified Λ2 times.
To handle the average measure avg, we can compute two differentially private data cubes
(partitioning the privacy budget across them), one with sum measure and one with count
measure c, from the same fact table. The avg measure of a cell can be computed from the
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two noisy data cubes, without violating differentially private.
3.4.3 Handling Larger Data Cubes
Our approaches introduced so far are applicable for mid-size data cubes, e.g., with ≤ 12
dimensions or ≤ 109 cells. Since the current framework needs to store all cells for consistency
enforcement, it cannot handle data cubes with too many cells.
For even larger data cubes (e.g., with ≥ 20 dimensions and ≥ 220 cuboids), it is unnec-
essary to publish all cuboids at one time, as typical users are likely to query only a very
small portion of them. Also, it may not be favorable to publish all cuboids while ensuring
differential privacy, as the huge amount of noise will make the result meaningless. So we
now outline an online version of our approach as follows.
Initially, Lpre = ∅ and we have certain amount ² of privacy budget. When a cuboid
query C comes, if C /∈ Lpre and C can be computed from some differentially private cuboid
C∗ ∈ Lpre, there are two choices: a) compute C from C∗, with error in C∗ magnified in C; or
b) compute real cuboid C using high-dimensional OLAP techniques like [55], inject noise into
C to obtain a differentially private cuboid, insert C into Lpre, and deduct a certain amount
of privacy budget from ². If C /∈ Lpre but C cannot be computed from any differentially
private cuboid C∗ ∈ Lpre, we have to follow b) above. If C ∈ Lpre or C used to be queried,
we can directly output the old differentially private cuboid C. After we run out of privacy
budget ², to ensure ²-differential privacy, we cannot create new differentially private cuboids
in Lpre any more and may be unable to answer new queries. How to distribute the privacy
budget online in such a way that more queries can be answered with less error is an online
decision problem, that is, decision must be made without knowledge about queries in future,
but should be able to handle future queries reasonably well. It has some connection to the
Online Set Cover problem, and we think it is interesting future work.
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Chapter 4
Enforcing Consistency in Noisy Cubes
The two publishing schemes, Kpart and Kgen, introduced in Chapter 3 publish differentially
private data cubes, but may also generate inconsistency across different cuboids in one data
cube. If we roll up measures across differentially private cuboids, the sums may not match
the totals recorded in other cuboids. The reason for such inconsistency is that the Laplace
mechanism add noise independently to each cell. According to a Microsoft user acceptance
study [47], users are likely to accept these kinds of small inconsistencies if they trust the
original data and understand why the inconsistencies are present. If the users do not trust
the original data, they may interpret the inconsistencies as evidence of bad data. In both
cases, after generating a set of cuboids to publish, one can enforce a requirement for correct
roll-up totals across dimensions while preserving differential privacy, and in some cases also
reduce the amount of noise, through a multidimensional extension of the techniques of [40].
In this chapter, we show how to take noisy measure c˜(·) as input and alter it into measure
cˆ(·) to fit consistency constraints that the cuboids should sum up correctly. Our consistency-
enforcing algorithm takes only c˜(·) as input (not touching the fact table T ), and thus from
the composition property of differential privacy (Theorem 2.1.3), it is also ²-differentially
private. The output consistent measure cˆ(·) should be as close to c˜(·) and c(·) as possible.
In Section 4.1, we will first discuss the reason of inconsistency, formally define the consis-
tency constraints, and the goal of our consistency-enforcing schemes. Then in Sections 4.2-
4.3, we will introduce severals approaches to enforce consistency with statistical performance
guarantee. In particular, in Sections 4.3.1-4.3.2, we will introduce approaches to enforce con-
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sistency in the data cubes published by Kpart and Kgen, which can even improve the utility
of noisy differentially private data cubes (reducing noise variance).
4.1 Consistency and Distance
Suppose Lpre = {C1, C2}, where [C1] = {A1, A2, A3} and [C2] = {A1, A2, A4}. Consider
cuboid [C] = {A1, A2} to be published. C can be computed from either C1 or C2. Since we
add noise to C1 and C2 independently, the two computations of C may yield different results.
A simple way to resolve such inconsistency is to revise Kpart by letting C be the weighted
(based on variance) average of the two results. But then C will not be an exact roll-up of
either C1 or C2, though it will be unbiased. Such inconsistency occurs in data cubes released
by Kall, Kpart, and Kgen, as long as Lpre contains more than one cuboid.
The basic idea of our approaches to enforce consistency across released cuboids is as
follows. Consider the noisy measures c˜(·) of cells in each cuboid C ∈ Lpre released by Kpart or
Kgen, where Lpre is selected by either Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2. Recall that, in Kall, Lpre is
the set of all cuboids to be published. We construct consistent measure cˆ(·) from c˜(·) so that
the consistency constraints are enforced and the distance between cˆ(·) and c˜(·) is minimized.
Since the algorithm takes only c˜(·) as the input and does not touch the real count measure
c(·) or the fact table T , ²-differential privacy is automatically preserved.
Consistency Constraints
Before presenting our approaches to enforce consistency, we first formalize the consistency
constraints. Clearly, there is no inconsistency if we compute measures of all cells from the
base cells (i.e., d-dim cells). For a cell a, let Base(a) be the set of all base cells, each of which
aggregates a disjoint subset of rows that are contained in a. Formally, a′ ∈ Base(a) if and
only if for any dimension Ai, a[i] 6= ∗ implies a[i] = a′[i]. So the consistency constraints we
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want to enforce for measure cˆ(·) are as follows:
∑
a′∈Base(a)
cˆ(a′) = cˆ(a), ∀ cells a. (4.1)
Distance Measures
We seek the choice of cˆ(·) that satisfies consistency constraints in (4.1) and is as close as
possible to c˜(·). The intuition is that, as we must compute cˆ(·) without reexamining c(·) to
preserve differential privacy, we can treat c˜(·) as an approximate version of c(·).
We use Lp distance (p ≥ 1) to measure how close cˆ(·) and c˜(·) are:
||cˆ(·)− c˜(·)||p =
∑
a∈Epre
(|cˆ(a)− c˜(a)|p)1/p , (4.2)
where Epre be the set of cells in cuboids belonging to Lpre, and we treat cˆ(·) and c˜(·) as vectors
in REpre . We will prove that the utility of optimal solutions for L1, L2, and L∞ distances
satisfies certain statistical utility guarantees, and a bit surprisingly, the utility of the L2
optimal solution cˆ(·) is even better than the utility of c˜(·).
Finding cˆ(·) to minimize ||cˆ(·) − c˜(·)||p subject to consistency constraints (4.1) can be
viewed as a least-norm problem. From classic results from convex optimization [10], it can
be solved efficiently, at least in theory. We will analyze the utility of L∞ and L1 optimal
solutions in Section 4.2. However, classic algorithms, such as linear programming, do not
work for our context in practice because the number of variables involved in (4.1) is equal to
the number of cells, which is huge. We provide a practical and theoretically sound algorithm
that minimizes the L2 distance in time linear in the number of cells in Section 4.3.
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4.2 Linear Programming Consistency
Minimizing L∞ Distance
We first consider minimizing the L∞ distance, which is essentially minimizing the maximal
difference between c˜(a) and cˆ(a) for any cell in Epre, i.e., ||cˆ(·)−c˜(·)||∞ = maxa∈Epre |cˆ(a)−c˜(a)|.
Equivalently, we solve for cˆ(·) in the following linear program.
minimize z (4.3)
s.t. |cˆ(a)− c˜(a)| ≤ z, ∀ cells a ∈ Epre;∑
a′∈Base(a)
cˆ(a′) = cˆ(a), ∀ cells a ∈ Epre.
The first set of constraints is used to bound the L∞ distance, and the second one is used
to enforce consistency (refer to (4.1)). This linear program is inspired by one approach in
Barak et al. [5], which considers a similar consistency enforcing scheme but injects noise
into all cuboids instead of the carefully-selected cuboid subset Lpre. Solving the above linear
program, we can bound the error of cˆ(·) with high probability as follows.
Theorem 4.2.1 (Generalized Theorem 8 in [5]) For cˆ(·) obtained by solving (4.3), with
probability at least 1− δ, where δ = |Epre|
eη/2
and Epre is the set of cells in cuboids Lpre,
∑
a∈Epre
|cˆ(a)− c(a)| ≤ |Epre||Lpre|
²
2 log
|Epre|
δ
=
|Epre||Lpre|
²
η.
Proof: Independent Laplace noise Lap(|Lpre|/²) is injected to each cell measure c(a) to
publish c˜(a). There are |Epre| cells; so from the CDF of Laplace distribution and union
bound, with probability 1 − δ, none of the cells has the absolute noise |c˜(a) − c(a)| larger
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than (|Lpre|/²) log(|Epre|/δ). c(·) is a feasible solution to (4.3) and cˆ(·) is the optimal. So
∀a ∈ Epre : |cˆ(a)− c(a)| ≤ |cˆ(a)− c˜(a)|+ |c(a)− c˜(a)| ≤ 2|c˜(a)− c(a)| ≤ |Lpre|
²
2 log
|Epre|
δ
.
The conclusion follows by summing the above inequalities up. 2
Minimizing L1 Distance
A linear program can also be used to minimize the L1 distance. As ||cˆ(·)−c˜(·)||1 =
∑
a |cˆ(a)−
c˜(a)|, we introduce an auxiliary variable za for each cell a in Epre (recall Epre is the set of
cells in cuboids belonging to Lpre, i.e., the cells to be released), together with a constraint
−za ≤ cˆ(a) − c˜(a) ≤ za. Then minimizing ||cˆ(·) − c˜(·)||1 while enforcing consistency in cˆ(·)
is equivalent to the following linear program.
minimize
∑
a∈Epre
za (4.4)
s.t. |cˆ(a)− c˜(a)| ≤ za, ∀ cell a ∈ Epre;∑
a′∈Base(a)
cˆ(a′) = cˆ(a), ∀ cell a ∈ Epre.
The error of the solution cˆ(·) is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2 For cˆ(·) obtained by solving (4.4), if ² ≤ 1, with probability at least 1− δ,
where δ = ( η
2eη/2−1 )
|Epre| (η > 2) and Epre is the set of cells in cuboids Lpre,
∑
a∈Epre
|cˆ(a)− c(a)| ≤ |Epre||Lpre|
²
η.
Proof: Let’s start with generalizing the Chernoff inequality for exponential distribution.
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Lemma 4.2.3 (Problem 1.10 in [19]) Let X = X1+X2+. . .+Xn where Xi’s are independent
and identically distributed with the exponential distribution with parameter α ∈ (0, 1). With
probability at least 1− δ, where δ = ( η
eη−1
)n
, we have X ≤ ηE [X] (η > 1).
The above lemma can be proved by considering the moment generating function. We
will utilize it to prove Theorem 4.2.2 in the following part:
For each cell a ∈ Epre, since Ya = c˜(a) − c(a) is a Laplace noise Lap(|Lpre|/²), we have
Xa = |Ya| is distributed with the exponential distribution with parameter ²/|Lpre| ∈ (0, 1) if
² ≤ |Lpre|. Let X =
∑
a∈Epre Xa. We have E [X] = |Epre||Lpre|/². From Lemma 4.2.3, we have,
with probability at least 1− δ, where δ = ( η
eη−1 )
|Epre|,
∑
a∈Epre |c˜(a)− c(a)| ≤ |Epre||Lpre|² η. So
∑
a∈Epre
|cˆ(a)− c(a)| ≤
∑
a∈Epre
|cˆ(a)− c˜(a)|+
∑
a∈Epre
|c˜(a)− c(a)|
≤
∑
a∈Epre
|c(a)− c˜(a)|+
∑
a∈Epre
|c˜(a)− c(a)|
≤ |Epre||Lpre|
²
2η.
The second inequality above is because c(·) is a feasible solution to (4.4) but cˆ(·) is the
optimal. Set η = η/2 to complete the proof. 2
For a data cube where the cardinality of every dimension is two, Theorem 8 in [5] yields
a bound similar to that of our Theorem 4.2.1, by discarding the integrality constraint (i.e.,
counts are integers). Theorem 4.2.2 mirrors Theorem 4.2.1, but replaces the upper tail
δ = |Epre|
eη
with ( η
2eη/2−1 )
|Epre|. As |Epre| is large, linear program (4.4) and Theorem 4.2.2 give a
much better bound on the average error in cˆ(·) than (4.3) and Theorem 4.2.1.
To enforce the integrality constraint for cˆ(·) obtained from linear program (4.3) or (4.4),
we can simply round cˆ(a) for each cell to the nearest integer, which will replace the error
bound |Epre||Lpre|
²
η with |Epre||Lpre|
²
η + |Epre| in both Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
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4.3 Least Squares Consistency
Now let’s focus on minimizing the L2 distance, i.e., the sum of squared differences between
c˜(a) and cˆ(a) for all cells. A bit surprisingly, this problem has a much more efficient solution
with better statistical guarantees than the LP-based methods introduced in Section 4.2.
In Kpart, a subset of cuboids Lpre is selected with equal amount of noise inserted into each
of them, and other cuboids are computed from the noisy cuboids Lpre to preserve differential
privacy. To further optimize the overall noise, in Kgen, for the selected subset Lpre of cuboids,
we also determine how to spend the privacy budget among them, and thus each cuboid may
be inserted with a different amount of noise. Recall that we use Epre to denote all cells in
Lpre; and in Kgen, we use σ2a to denote the noise variance of a cell a and σ2C to denote the
noise variance of cells in a cuboid C. Section 4.3.1 introduces how to enforce consistency
in Kpart by solving the unweighted version of the L2-distance minimization problem, and
Section 4.3.2 introduce how to enforce consistency in Kgen by solving the weighted version.
4.3.1 Unweighted Version: Enforcing Consistency in Kpart
Program (4.5) can be viewed as a least L2-norm problem. Its unique solution cˆ(·), called
the least square solution, can be found using linear algebra [10]. The classical method needs
to compute multiplication/inversion of M × M -matrices, where M = Πj|Aj| is the total
number of base cells. Since M is typically larger than 106, the classical method is inefficient
in our context. Fortunately, we can derive the optimal solution cˆ(·) much more efficiently by
utilizing the structure of data cubes, as follows.
minimize
∑
a∈Epre
(cˆ(a)− c˜(a))2 (4.5)
s.t.
∑
a′∈Base(a)
cˆ(a′) = cˆ(a), ∀ cell a ∈ Lpre.
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We define Ancs(a′) to be the set of ancestor cells of cell a′: a ∈ Ancs(a′) if and only if
a is in an ancestor of the cuboid containing a′ and has the same value as a′ on all non-∗
dimensions; formally, a ∈ Ancs(a′) if and only if for any dimension Ai, a[i] 6= ∗ implies
a[i] = a′[i]. If a′ is a base cell, a ∈ Ancs(a′)⇔ a′ ∈ Base(a).
For a cell a and a cuboid C, let a[C] be a’s values on dimensions of [C]. Suppose
[C] = {Ai1 , . . . , Aik}, a[C] = 〈a[i1], . . . , a[ik]〉. For two cuboids C1 and C2, let C1 ∨C2 be the
cuboid with dimensions [C1] ∪ [C2] and C1 ∧ C2 with dimensions [C1] ∩ [C2].
We provide the following two-stage algorithm to compute the consistent measure cˆ(·)
that is the optimal solution to program (4.5):
1. Bottom-up stage: We first compute obs(a′′) for each cell a′′ in cuboids L to be released:
obs(a′′) =
∑
a′∈Base(a′′)
∑
a∈Epre∩Ancs(a′)
c˜(a). (4.6)
The quantity obs(a′′) is well-defined if a′′ is in a cuboid C ′′ that can be computed from
Lpre. A cuboid C ∈ Lpre is maximal in Lpre if there is no C ′ ∈ Lpre s.t. C ≺ C ′. In all
maximal cuboids C ′′ in Lpre, obs(a′′) can be computed as in Formula (4.6). In all the other
cuboids that can be computed from Lpre, obs(a′′) can be computed recursively as follows:
suppose a′′ ∈ C ′′ and C ′′ can be computed from Lpre, there must be some cuboid C with
dimensionality dim(C ′′) + 1 s.t. either C ∈ Lpre or C can be computed from Lpre; then,
obs(a′′) =
∑
a: a∈C
a[C′′]=a′′[C′′]
obs(a). (4.7)
2. Top-down stage: After obs(a′′) is computed for every possible cell a′′, consider another
quantity est(a′′) for each cell a′′ ∈ C ′′:
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est(a′′) =
∑
C∈Lpre
∑
b: b∈(C∧C′′),
b[C∧C′′]=a′′[C∧C′′]
deg(C ∨ C ′′)cˆ(b), (4.8)
where deg(C) =
∏
Ai∈A−[C] |Ai| and A is the set of all dimensions and |Ai| is the cardinality
of dimension Ai. Suppose obs(·)’s are computed in the first stage as constants and cˆ(·)’s
are variables. Solving the equations est(a′′) = obs(a′′), we can compute cˆ(·)’s in a top-down
manner (from ancestors to descendants) as follows:
ratio(C ′′) =
∑
C: C∈Lpre,
C′′¹C
deg(C ∨ C ′′), (4.9)
aux(a′′) =
∑
C: C∈Lpre,
C′′C
∑
b: b∈(C∧C′′),
b[C∧C′′]=a′′[C∧C′′]
deg(C ∨ C ′′)cˆ(b), (4.10)
cˆ(a′′) =
1
ratio(C ′′)
(obs(a′′)− aux(a′′)) . (4.11)
We note that this approach essentially generalizes the consistency-enforcing scheme in
[40] from a tree-like structure (hierarchy of intervals to answer one-dimensional range queries)
to a lattice. The method in [40] cannot be directly applied here.
The above two-stage approach can be also applied to Kall because Kall is a special case of
Kpart obtained by setting Lpre = L and injecting equal amount of noise into each cuboid in
Lpre. We will show how to generalize it for Kgen in Section 4.3.2.
Optimality. We can prove cˆ(·) obtained above is not only consistent but also an unbiased
estimator of c(·). Also, cˆ(·) is optimal in the sense that no other linear unbiased estimator
of c(·) obtained from c˜(·) has smaller variance, i.e., smaller mean squared error.
Theorem 4.3.1 (i) The above algorithm correctly computes a value for cˆ(·) that is consistent
and solves the L2 minimization problem (4.5). (ii) The above algorithm requires O(N(d2 +
d|Lpre|)) time to compute cˆ(·) for all the N cells to be released. (iii) For any cell of cuboids
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in Lpre, cˆ(a) is an unbiased estimator of c(a), i.e., E [cˆ(a)] = c(a). (iv) For any cell a, cˆ(a)
has the smallest variance among any linear unbiased estimator (e.g., c˜(a)) of c(a) obtained
from c˜(·). (v) For any set P of cells, ∑a∈P cˆ(a) has the smallest variance among any linear
unbiased estimator of
∑
a∈P c(a) obtained from c˜(·).
Proof: We will prove the correctness, efficiency, and statistical optimality one by one.
(i) Correctness. We rewrite (4.5) as an unconstrained version:
minimize f(cˆ(·)) =
∑
a∈Epre
 ∑
a′∈Base(a)
cˆ(a′)
− c˜(a)
2 .
To obtain the optimal solution, setting the gradient of f(cˆ(·)) w.r.t. cˆ(a′) for each base
cell a′ to be zero. For each base cell a′,
∂f
∂cˆ(a′)
= 2
∑
a: a∈Epre, a′∈Base(a)
 ∑
a′∈Base(a)
cˆ(a′)
− c˜(a)

= 2
∑
a∈Epre∩Ancs(a′)
(cˆ(a)− c˜(a)) = 0,
which is equivalent to ∑
a∈Epre∩Ancs(a′)
cˆ(a) =
∑
a∈Epre∩Ancs(a′)
c˜(a). (4.12)
For any cell a′′ in a cuboid C ′′, sum up Equation (4.12) for all base cells a′ ∈ Base(a′′). On
the left-hand side, we have (let Base denote the set of all base cells):
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est(a′′) =
∑
a′∈Base(a′′)
∑
a∈Epre∩Ancs(a′)
cˆ(a)
=
∑
C∈Lpre
∑
a′∈Base(a′′)
∑
a∈C∩Ancs(a′)
cˆ(a)
=
∑
C∈Lpre
∑
a′: a′∈Base,
a′[C′′]=a′′[C′′]
∑
a: a∈C,
a[C]=a′[C]
cˆ(a)
=
∑
C∈Lpre
∑
a∈C
∑
a′: a′∈Base, a[C]=a′[C]
a′[C′′]=a′′[C′′]
cˆ(a)
=
∑
C∈Lpre
∑
a: a∈C,
a[C∧C′′]=a′′[C∧C′′]
∑
a′: a′∈Base, a[C]=a′[C]
a′[C′′]=a′′[C′′]
cˆ(a)
=
∑
C∈Lpre
∑
a: a∈C,
a[C∧C′′]=a′′[C∧C′′]
cˆ(a) ∏
Ai∈A−[C]−[C′′]
|Ai|

=
∑
C∈Lpre
∑
b: b∈(C∧C′′),
b[C∧C′′]=a′′[C∧C′′]
cˆ(b) ∏
Ai∈A−[C]−[C′′]
|Ai|

=
∑
C∈Lpre
∑
b: b∈(C∧C′′),
b[C∧C′′]=a′′[C∧C′′]
deg(C ∨ C ′′)cˆ(b), (4.13)
where deg(C) =
∏
Ai∈A−[C] |Ai| and A is the set of all dimensions and |Ai| is the cardinality
of dimension Ai. On the right-hand side, we have
obs(a′′) =
∑
a′∈Base(a′′)
∑
a∈Epre∩Ancs(a′)
c˜(a) =
∑
a: a∈C
a[C′′]=a′′[C′′]
obs(a), (4.14)
where C could be any cuboid that is a descendant of C ′′ and can be computed from Lpre.
So for each cell a′′, we can compute the value of obs(a′′) recursively from c˜(·). Starting from
the base cuboid, obs(·) can be computed level-by-level from bottom to top.
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From Equation (4.12), we know est(a′′) = obs(a′′). So we can construct a linear system
with cˆ(·) as variables. From this linear system, we can obtain cˆ(·) as in (4.6)-(4.11).
(ii) Time Complexity. We consider how to compute cˆ(a) for all cells here (of course
including the ones in L). For each base cell a′, we compute obs(a′) as in (4.6) (recall
Base(a′) = {a′} for a base cell a′), for all base cells using O(M |Lpre|) time. For other cells a′′
in the data cube, we compute obs(a′′) as in (4.7), from d-dim cuboids to the 0-dim cuboid,
using O(Nd2) time in total.
Now we compute cˆ(a) from the 0-dim cuboid to d-dim cuboids as in (4.9)-(4.11): assuming
deg(·) and ratio(·) have been precomputed, aux(a′′) (and thus cˆ(a′′)) can be computed in
O(d|Lpre|) time as for each C ∈ Lpre, there is only one cell b satisfying the summing-up
condition in (4.10). So in total, we need O(N(d2+d|Lpre|)) time to compute cˆ(a) for all cells
in the data cube.
(iii) Unbiased. We can prove E [cˆ(a)] = c(a) by induction on the dimensionality of a.
Recall E [c˜(a)] = c(a). For the 0-dim cell a0, we have aux(a0) = 0, and thus from (4.6) and
(4.11), cˆ(a0) is nothing but the weighted average of “different ways to obtain it from cuboids
in Lpre”. We can show E [cˆ(a0)] = c(a0) using the linearity of expectation. For an i-dim cell,
we first take expectation on both sides of (4.11), and then use linearity of expectation and
the induction assumption to draw the conclusion.
(iv)-(v) Optimality. For (i) and (iii), cˆ(·) is the ordinary least squares estimator (mini-
mizing L2 norm (4.5)) and unbiased. Independent noise with identical variance is injected.
So the promised properties follow from the Gauss-Markov theorem [71]. 2
4.3.2 Weighted Version: Enforcing Consistency in Kgen
In Kgen, each cell a in a cuboid C ∈ Lpre is injected with different amount of noise with
variance σ2a = Var [c˜(a)] = 2λ
2
C/²
2. If cells are from the same cuboid C, the noise variances
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are the same, so we denote it as σ2C . We will use σ
2
a and σ
2
C interchangeably if a is from
C. The generalized least squares or Aitken estimator extends the Gauss-Markov theorem
[71] for the case when the injected Laplacian noise samples are uncorrelated with each other
and with the independent variables but have different variances. So we now revise the
L2-distance minimization problem in (4.5) for generalized least squares, to guarantee the
statistical optimality of the solution
minimize
∑
a∈Epre
(cˆ(a)− c˜(a))2
σ2a
(4.15)
s.t.
∑
a′∈Base(a)
cˆ(a′) = cˆ(a), ∀ cell a ∈ Lpre.
The only difference between programs (4.15) and (4.5) is that we have a weight 1/σ2a for each
term in (4.15)’s objective function. So the algorithm for solving (4.5) can be also revised to
solve (4.15) with the same time complexity and the same statistical optimality.
1. Bottom-up stage: We first compute obs(a′′) for each cell a′′ in cuboids L to be released:
obs(a′′) =
∑
a′∈Base(a′′)
∑
a∈Epre∩Ancs(a′)
c˜(a)
σ2a
. (4.16)
2. Top-down stage: After obs(a′′) is computed for every possible cell a′′, consider another
quantity est(a′′) for each cell a′′ ∈ C ′′:
est(a′′) =
∑
C∈Lpre
∑
b: b∈(C∧C′′),
b[C∧C′′]=a′′[C∧C′′]
deg(C ∨ C ′′)cˆ(b)
σ2C
. (4.17)
Similarly, suppose obs(·)’s are computed in the first stage as constants and cˆ(·)’s are variables.
Solving the equations est(a′′) = obs(a′′), we can compute cˆ(·)’s in a top-down manner (from
ancestors to descendants) as follows:
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ratio(C ′′) =
∑
C: C∈Lpre,
C′′¹C
deg(C ∨ C ′′)
σ2C
, (4.18)
aux(a′′) =
∑
C: C∈Lpre,
C′′C
∑
b: b∈(C∧C′′),
b[C∧C′′]=a′′[C∧C′′]
deg(C ∨ C ′′)cˆ(b)
σ2C
, (4.19)
cˆ(a′′) =
1
ratio(C ′′)
(obs(a′′)− aux(a′′)) . (4.20)
Theorem 4.3.2 (i) The above algorithm correctly computes a value for cˆ(·) that is consistent
and solves the L2 minimization problem (4.15). (ii) The above algorithm requires O(N(d2 +
d|Lpre|)) time to compute cˆ(·) for all the N cells to be released. (iii) For any cell of cuboids
in Lpre, cˆ(a) is an unbiased estimator of c(a), i.e., E [cˆ(a)] = c(a). (iv) For any cell a, cˆ(a)
has the smallest variance among any linear unbiased estimator (e.g., c˜(a)) of c(a) obtained
from c˜(·). (v) For any set P of cells, ∑a∈P cˆ(a) has the smallest variance among any linear
unbiased estimator of
∑
a∈P c(a) obtained from c˜(·).
Proof: The proof to this theorem is almost identical to the one for Theorem 4.3.1. The key
idea is to show that finding the optimal solution to (4.15) is equivalent to finding the unique
solution for the following linear system (with variables as cˆ(a)’s for all cells a’s):
∑
a∈Epre∩Ancs(a′)
cˆ(a)
σ2a
=
∑
a∈Epre∩Ancs(a′)
c˜(a)
σ2a
. (4.21)
We omit the details in this proof for its similarity to the proof for Theorem 4.3.1. 2
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Chapter 5
Background Knowledge on Cuboids
Since the notion of differential privacy was introduced in [26, 20], it has become more and
more popular recently. As indicated by its name, it protects privacy of any differential user,
or in other words, including into or excluding any particular user from the database does
not affect the output of a differentially private algorithm to a sensible degree. However, as
shown in [43], certain types of background knowledge may break differential privacy. An
undesirable consequence is that, with certain background knowledge, an adversary could
reduce the noise variable by a factor proportional to the size of the dataset.
In this chapter, we first review the notation of generic differential privacy [43] in Sec-
tion 5.1. This notation of privacy aims to incorporate adversary’s background knowledge
into the model of differential privacy. In the contexts of data cubes, we are interested in
background knowledge in the form of some cuboids that need to be released exactly (be-
cause of laws of policies). Adversaries can utilize these exact cuboids to attack individuals’
privacy. Intuitively, the more background knowledge adversaries have, the more noise needs
to be injected to preserve individuals’ privacy. By studying generic differential privacy, we
want to answer questions about how much noise is necessary for certain amount/type of ad-
versary’s background knowledge. We introduce our new results on ways to preserve generic
differential privacy and its properties in Section 5.2. We also propose techniques to optimize
noise source in data cubes to be released subject to background knowledge (i.e., with some
exact cuboids released) while preserving generic differential privacy in Section 5.3.
68
5.1 Background: Generic Differential Privacy
Generic differential privacy was proposed by Kifer and Machanavajjhala in [43]. It generalizes
the definition of neighborhood in the original differential privacy, which take the adversary’s
background knowledge into consideration. The intuition is that, representing the background
knowledge as a set of constraints, the adversary knows that some databases are infeasible
(which do not satisfy some constraints); and the adversary can then focus on all feasible
databases instead, which satisfy all constraints. So we define T and T ′ to be neighbors iff
they are both feasible, and there is no other feasible table on the shortest path between T and
T ′. We formally define neighbors according to the following definitions.
Definition 5.1.1 (Background Knowledge) For a fact table T , background knowledge
Q is a set of cuboids {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk} ⊆ Lall that are released exactly.
Definition 5.1.2 (Move [43]) Given a fact table T , a move m is a process that adds or
deletes a tuple from T , resulting in a fact table T ′ = m(T ).
Definition 5.1.3 (Feasible Tables TQ) Given background knowledge Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . ,
Qk}, a fact table is feasible if the count measures in its corresponding cuboids are identical
to the ones in Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk. Let TQ be the set of all feasible tables w.r.t. Q.
Definition 5.1.4 (Induced Neighbors NQ [43]) Given background knowledge Q, a pair
of fact tables Ta and Tb are said to be neighbors induced by Q, denoted as NQ(Ta, Tb) = true,
iff (i) Ta, Tb ∈ TQ, and (ii) for any shortest sequence of moves Mab = m1,m2, . . . ,mdab that
transform Ta into Tb, no subsequence of Mab can transform Ta into some other Tc ∈ TQ. We
also denote the set of all induced neighbors of T by Q as NQ(T ).
Definition 5.1.5 (Generic Differential Privacy [43]) Given background knowledge Q,
a randomized algorithm K is ²-differentially private if for any two tables T1 and T2 that are
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neighbors induced by Q and any subset S of the output of K,
Pr [K(T1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(²)× Pr [K(T2) ∈ S] ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of K and ² is a fixed value.
Definition 5.1.5 can be specialized into the original notation of differential privacy in
Definition 2.1.1, if we set the background knowledge Q to be empty.
To preserve generic differential in data publishing subject to background knowledge, the
Laplace mechanism [26] can be generalized as follows.
Definition 5.1.6 (Generic Sensitivity [43]) Consider any function F : T → Rn and
background knowledge Q, the L1 global generic sensitivity of F w.r.t. Q is:
SQ(F ) = max
T2∈T
(
max
T1∈NQ(T2)
‖F (T1)− F (T2)‖1
)
,
where ‖x − y‖1 =
∑
1≤i≤n |xi − yi| is the L1 distance between two n-dimensional vectors
x = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 and y = 〈y1, y2, . . . , yn〉.
Theorem 5.1.1 (Generic Laplacian mechanism [43]) Let F : T → Rn be a query se-
quence of length n against a table T ∈ T , and Q be the background knowledge that has to be
released exactly. The randomized algorithm that takes as input table T and output F˜ (T ) =
F (T ) + 〈Lap(SQ(F )/²)〉n is ²-differentially private.
Example 5.1.1 Consider the fact table T in Table 1.1 with three dimensions: Sex, Age, and
Salary. Background knowledge is a set of cuboids that are released to or known to adversaries
exactly. For example, if the adversary knows how many people are male and how many are
female, the background knowledge Q contains one cuboid {Sex}. If in addition to that,
the adversary knows the count histogram on people’s age, i.e., the cuboid {Age} is released
exactly, then the background knowledge Q = {{Sex}, {Age}}.
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5.2 Preserving Generic Differential Privacy
We need to compute generic sensitivity SQ in order to apply the generic Laplacian mecha-
nism, and [43] shows that it is hard to estimate the generic sensitivity for general data type
and background knowledge. But, in Section 5.2, we will show that it is possible to estimate
SQ in data cubes when the background knowledge is a set of exact cuboids (Definition 5.1.1).
In Section 5.2.2, we will introduce two useful properties: projection and composition.
5.2.1 Estimating Generic Sensitivity
Consider a d-dim fact table T with attributes A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ad}. Recall |Ai| is the
cardinality of dimension Ai. Let Cbase be the d-dim base cuboid. For a cuboid C, recall [C]
is the set of its dimensions. For a subset of dimensions A′ ⊆ A, let size(A′) = ∏Ai∈A′ |Ai|.
Define size(∅) = 1. size([C]) is essentially the number of all possible cells in cuboids C.
Kifer and Machanavajjhala in [43] study a special case for 2-dim fact tables.
Lemma 5.2.1 ([43]) Consider a 2-dim fact table T with two attributes A1 and A2. (i) If
the background knowledge Q = {{A1}} (row sums or column sums), the generic sensitivity
of publishing Cbase is SQ(Cbase) = 2. (ii) If Q = {{A1}, {A2}} (both row sums and column
sums), the generic sensitivity of publishing Cbase is SQ(Cbase) = 2min{|A1|, |A2|}.
We will generalize Lemma 5.2.1 for d-dim fact table T , with background knowledge Q as
any one or two cuboids. Again we want to publish the base cuboid Cbase, subject to Q.
Lemma 5.2.2 Consider a d-dim fact table T . (i) If the background knowledge Q = {C} for
any cuboid C, the generic sensitivity of publishing Cbase is SQ(Cbase) = 2. (ii) If Q = {C1, C2}
for any two cuboids, then SQ(Cbase) = 2min{size([C1]− [C2]), size([C2]− [C1])}.
Proof: The proof for (i) is trivial and is very similar to the proof for (i) in Lemma 5.2.1.
For (ii), let’s first prove SQ(Cbase) ≤ 2min{size([C1]− [C2]), size([C2]− [C1])}.
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Recall T is the set of all d-dim fact tables with attributes A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ad}, and
TQ ⊆ T is the set of all feasible fact tables subject to background knowledge Q. Consider
any two feasible fact tables Ta, Tb ∈ TQ, it suffices to show that, if a shortest sequence Mab
of moves that transforms Ta into Tb is longer than 2min{size([C1]− [C2]), size([C2]− [C1])},
a subsequence of these moves can transform Ta into another feasible table Tc ∈ TQ. Then,
for any two (induced) neighboring fact table Ta and Tb, we must have the length of the
shortest move sequence |Mab| ≤ 2min{size([C1] − [C2]), size([C2] − [C1])}, and thus we can
have SQ(Cbase) ≤ |Mab| ≤ 2min{size([C1]− [C2]), size([C2]− [C1])}, because the L1 distance
between the base cuboids on the two tables Ta and Tb is no more than |Mab|.
For a cell a in Cbase, and the two cuboids C1 and C2, recall a[Ci] is the projection of a
on [Ci], i.e., the cell in Ci which has the same attributes values as a in [Ci].
We construct a directed bipartite graph as follows. The vertices are cells in C1 and C2.
In Mab, for a move which increases the count c(a) of a cell a in Cbase by one (positive move),
we create an edge from a[C1] to a[C2]; and for a move which decreases the count c(a) by one
(negative move), we create an edge from a[C2] to a[C1]. Because both Ta and Tb are feasible,
we have the same number of positive moves incident on a[Ci] as the number of negative
moves; or, in this graph, each vertex has the same in-degree as the out-degree.
A directed sub-cycle in this graph corresponds to a subset of the moves which transform
Ta into another feasible table Tc (because one positive move and one negative move incident
on cells of C1 and C2 do not violate the background knowledge). So we want to show that,
if |Mab| > 2min{size([C1] − [C2]), size([C2] − [C1])}, there exists such a nontrivial proper
sub-cycle, which contracts to the fact that Ta and Tb are induced neighbors.
It is easy to see that, if |Mab| > 2min{size([C1]), size([C2])}, there exists such a sub-
cycle. There is an Eulerian directed walk W (starting and ending at the same vertex) in
this graph, because each vertex has the same number of in-degree as out-degree. |Mab| >
2min{size([C1]), size([C2])} implies that some vertex v in C1 or C2 has degree at least 4,
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and thus it is visited at least twice in W (i.e. W = u . . . vW ′v . . . u). So we can extract a
nontrivial proper sub-cycle from W at vertex v (it could be vW ′v).
To get the tight bound |Mab| ≤ |2min{size([C1] − [C2]), size([C2] − [C1])}, we note that
the graph has been divided into size([C1] ∩ [C2]) connected components in nature. Because,
according to the construction, any two cells a1 ∈ C1 and a2 ∈ C2 are connected only if a1
and a2 have the same values in the attributes [C1] ∩ [C2]. And in each component, we have
size([C1] − [C2]) vertices from C1 and size([C2] − [C1]) vertices from C2 (and each vertex
has the same in-degree as the out-degree). So based on an argument similar to the one for
|Mab| ≤ 2min{size([C1]), size([C2])}, we can prove this tight bound as well.
To prove SQ(Cbase) is indeed equal to 2min{size([C1] − [C2]), size([C2] − [C1])}, we con-
struct a cycle with length 2min{size([C1]− [C2]), size([C2]− [C1])}, which corresponds to a
shortest sequence Mab of moves between two feasible tables. It satisfies two properties: (i)
the base cuboids on the two tables have L1 distance equal to |Mab|; and (ii) no subset of
Mab can yield another feasible table. It can be constructed as follows: Number all possible
assignments of values to attributes in [C1]− [C2] as 1, 2, . . . , size([C1]− [C2]), and all possible
assignments of values to attributes in [C2]− [C1] as 1, 2, . . . , size([C2]− [C1]). Consider such a
cycle: (1, x)→ (x, 1)→ (2, x)→ (x, 2)→ . . .→ (1, x), where (i, x) is a cell in C1 with value
i in attributes [C1]− [C2] and value x in [C1]∩ [C2], and similarly (x, j) is a cell in C2 with j in
[C2]− [C1] and x in [C1]∩ [C2]. This cycle has length 2min{size([C1]− [C2]), size([C2]− [C1])}.
Easy to very this cycle satisfies properties (i) and (ii). So the proof is completed. 2
Note that Lemma 5.2.2 also considers a special case: when C1 ¹ C2, SQ(Cbase) = 2.
Example 5.2.1 Consider the fact table T in Table 1.1 with three dimensions: Sex, Age,
and Salary. Two cuboids C1 = {Sex,Age} and C2 = {Age, Salary} are released exactly (Q =
{C1, C2}). From Lemma 5.2.2, the sensitivity of releasing Cbase = {Sex,Age, Salary} subject
to Q is 2min{size([C1]− [C2]), size([C2]− [C1])} = 2min{|Sex|, |Salary|} = 4.
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Figure 5.1: A shortest sequence of moves for 2× 2× 2 case
When |Q| ≥ 3, the problem of estimating the sensitivity SQ(Cbase) is quite open. We
only have results for some special cases. For example, when Q = {{A1}, {A2}, {A3}}, where
the cardinalities of attributes are |A1| = 2, |A2| = 2, and |A3| = x: if x = 2 or 3, we have
SQ(Cbase) = 6 (refer to Figure 5.1), and if x = 4, we have SQ(Cbase) = 8.
From these example, we may observe that, for background knowledge with more than
two cuboids, the sensitivity SQ is not linearly dependent on the cardinalities of two or three
dimensions in the table, but dependent on some “blocking” structures.
An Extremal Combinatorial Problem
Let’s model/generalize the sensitivity computation problem in data cubes as an extremal
combinatorics problem, which is a widely open problem even in combinatorial mathematics.
Let V(n, k) = {v | v ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {0,−1}n, and ‖v‖1 = k} be the set of all n-dim
vectors, each with (n− k) ’0’-entries and either k ’1’-entries or k ’−1’-entries. A vector set
V ⊆ V(n, k) is said to be stationary if ∑v∈V v = 0. A stationary vector set V is irreducible
if no non-empty proper subset V ′ ⊂ V is stationary. We consider such an extremal problem:
given n and k, what is the maximal size of an irreducible stationary vector set V ⊆ V(n, k)?
Denote this maximal size by S(n, k). Our original sensitivity computation problem actually
corresponds to a restricted version, in which the n coordinates are partitions into k sets,
and we considered only vectors V(n, k) that have one nonzero entry in each vector. Here,
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corresponding to our problem, n is the sum of cardinalities of attributes and k = |Q| is the
number of cuboids the adversary has as background knowledge. Any meaning lower/upper
bound on S(n, k) implies lower/upper bound on the sensitivity in our problem.
Adapting the proof for Lemma 5.2.2, we actually have proved the following result.
Lemma 5.2.3 S(n, 1) = 2 and S(n, 2) = n.
Without coming up with the proof, we conjecture that:
Conjecture 1 Given n and k, S(n, k) = Θ(nk/2).
A relevant extremal problem. In a relevant problem, we have V(n, k) = {v | v ∈
{0, 1}n, and ||v||1 ≤ k}. Let N(n, k, r) be the maximal size of a vector set ⊆ V(n, k) s.t.
each r vectors in this set are linearly independent modulo 2 (i.e., even number of ones in each
of the n coordinates). Suppose r is closed to n, this number is known as nΘ(k/2) according to
a sequence of work [49, 50, 6, 7, 65]. This problem seem to be similar to our problem, but
their techniques cannot be directly applied.
5.2.2 Useful Properties of Generic Differential Privacy
There are two useful properties of generic differential privacy, projection and composition.
The projection property is about how much the background knowledge is projected into
a subspace (cuboid) of the fact table. Note that Lemma 5.2.2 is about the sensitivity of
releasing the base cuboid Cbase subject to the background knowledge Q. A natural question
is: subject to Q, how much is the sensitivity of releasing any cuboid C? The following lemma
says that, the sensitivity stays almost unchanged for all the cuboids C (except the ones that
can be computed from Q), if the background knowledge Q is fixed.
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Lemma 5.2.4 (Projection property) In a data cube, if the background knowledge Q is
fixed, for any cuboid C that cannot be computed from Q, we have SQ(C) ≤ SQ(Cbase). If
[C]−⋃Ci∈Q[Ci] 6= ∅, SQ(C) = SQ(Cbase); otherwise, 12SQ(Cbase) ≤ SQ(C) ≤ SQ(Cbase)
Proof: SQ(C) ≤ SQ(Cbase) is obvious. For any two induced neighbors Ta and Tb, let Ca and
Cb be the cuboids constructed from Ta and Tb, respectively, on dimensions [C] = [C
a] = [Cb].
Similarly for Cabase and C
b
base. Then we must have ‖Ca − Cb‖1 ≤ ‖Cabase − Cbbase‖1.
If there is an attribute A0 in [C] −
⋃
Ci∈Q[Ci], consider any two induced neighbors Ta,
Tb, and a shortest sequence Mab of moves that transforms Ta into Tb. A0 has at least two
values, say, x and y. Then for each positive move in Mab, we can enforce it add a tuple with
A0 = x, and for each negative move in Mab, we can enforce it delete a tuple with A0 = y. In
other words, positive moves and negative moves do not cancel out each other in C. So we
must have ‖Ca − Cb‖1 = |Mab| = ‖Cabase − Cbbase‖1, and thus SQ(C) = SQ(Cbase).
If [C]−⋃Ci∈Q[Ci] = ∅, we can carefully arrange the positive moves and negative moves
in Mab within C, so that most of them do not cancel out each other. In most cases, we still
can show that SQ(C) = SQ(Cbase), and in the worst case, SQ(C) ≥ 12SQ(Cbase). 2
The transition and composition properties allow the combining of the publications or
outcomes of several differentially private algorithms. These two properties still hold for
generic differential privacy as long as the background knowledge Q is fixed. The statement
and the proof are similar to Theorem 2.1.3. We repeat the statement for completeness:
Theorem 5.2.5 (Transition and composition properties) Let Ki(·) or Ki(·, ·) be a ran-
domized algorithm which is ²i-differentially private subject to background knowledge Q.
1. For a table T , outputting K1(T ) and K2(T,K1(T )) is (²1 + ²2)-differentially private
subject to background knowledge Q.
2. For any input table T and any algorithm K, outputting K1(T ) and K(K1(T )) is ²1-
differentially private subject to background knowledge Q.
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3. For any two input tables T1 and T2 such that T1∩T2 = ∅, outputting K1(T1) and K1(T2)
is ²1-differentially private subject to background knowledge Q.
5.3 Optimizing Noise on Background Knowledge
For a fact table T , to publish a set L ⊆ Lall of cuboids subject to certain background
knowledge Q, we can inserted Laplace noise into Cbase according to Lemma 5.2.2 and Theo-
rem 5.1.1, and compute other cuboids from it. A better way is to apply the noise optimization
technique Kpart introduced in Section 3.2 or Kgen introduced in Section 3.3. Following is a
revised version of Kgen, denoted as KQgen to handle the background knowledge.
Recall KQgen chooses to compute cuboids Lpre directly from the fact table T , and then
adds noise Lap(λC/²) to cells in C ∈ Lpre. Lpost = L−Lpre includes all the other cuboids in
L. Again, we do not require Lpre ⊆ L. KQgen works as follows.
1. (Noise Sources) For each cell a in cuboid C ∈ Lpre, KQgen computes c(a) from T but
releases c˜(a) = c(a)+Lap(λC/²). Lpre is selected s.t. Lpost can be computed from Lpre.
2. (Aggregation) For each cuboid C ∈ Lpost, KQgen selects a descendant cuboid C∗ from Lpre
s.t. C∗ º C, and computes c˜(a) for each cell a ∈ C by aggregating the noisy measure
of cells in C∗. C∗ is picked in the same way as in Kgen (refer to Section 3.3.1).
The major difference between Kgen and KQgen is the constraint which the noise parameters
{λC} must satisfy to preserve (generic) ²-differential privacy.
Theorem 5.3.1 KQgen is ²-differentially private subject to Q if
∑
C∈Lpre 1/λC = 1/SQ(Cbase).
For any released cell a in L, c˜(a) is an unbiased estimator of c(a), i.e., E [c˜(a)] = c(a).
Proof: The first part can be proved using the composition property of generic differential
privacy (Theorem 5.2.5). And the second part is similar to Theorem 3.2.3. 2
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Also similar to Kgen, we can define different noise-control objectives of KQgen as in Prob-
lems 3 and 4. Our algorithms introduced in Section 3.3.2 can be revised to find such Lpre
and noise parameters {λC | C ∈ Lpre}, aiming at minimizing the max noise in the released
cuboids, or maximizing the number (weight) of cuboids with noise variance ≤ θ0.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Study
We will exam techniques proposed in this thesis using both real datasets and synthetic
datasets. Our goal is to verify the analytical and theoretical results about our techniques,
and demonstrate their effectiveness on real data. Different techniques are compared experi-
mentally to show their own advantages and disadvantages.
6.1 Experiment Setting and Datasets
Techniques for comparison. We evaluate and compare nine proposed techniques on both
real datasets and synthetic datasets, together with their application to publish data cubes
subject to exact background knowledge. The first two techniques are Kall and Kbase, which
were defined at the beginning of Section 3.2. We denote them as All and Base, respectively, in
this chapter. Another two are based on our noise-control framework, cuboid selection, Kpart.
One of these has the objective of bounding the max noise variance (Problem 1) and is denoted
by BMax (Kpart + Algorithm 1). The other one has the objective of maximizing the number
of cuboids with noise variance no more than a given variance threshold θ0 (Problem 2) and
is denoted by PMost (Kpart + Algorithm 2). We also test our more general noise-control
framework, distribution selection, Kgen (different amounts of Laplace noise are inserted into
different initial cuboids). We implement the algorithm that selects an initial set of cuboids
and the amounts of noise to be inserted into each of them with the goal of minimizing
the max noise variance (Problem 3), and denote is as BMaxG (Kgen + Algorithm 3). The
79
last four techniques apply the methods in Section 4.3 to enforce consistency in the data
cubes published by All (Lpre = L), BMax, PMost, and BMaxG. In particular, the unweighted
version of the L2-minimization consistency-enforcing method in Section 4.3.1 is applied for
All, BMax, and PMost, resulting in three techniques denoted as AllC, BMaxC, and PMostC,
respectively. The weighted version in Section 4.3.2 is applied for BMaxG because different
amounts of noise are injected into different cuboids; and the resulting technique is denoted
as BMaxGC. The LP-based techniques in Section 4.2 are not practical for large tables. All
seven algorithms are coded in C++ and evaluated on an 8GB 64-bit 2.40GHz PC.
We will specify L, the set of cuboids to published, and the privacy parameter ², for these
algorithms. All the algorithms are evaluated on the same set of published cuboids.
Real dataset. We use the Adult dataset and the Nursery dataset from the UCI Ma-
chine Learning Repository (http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/) in the experiments. The Adult
dataset was extracted from the census bureau database with 32,561 rows with 8 categorical
dimensions: workclass (cardinality 9), education (16), marital-status (7), occupation (15),
relationship (6), race (5), sex (2), and salary (2). The Nursery dataset was derived from
a hierarchical decision model originally developed to rank applications for nursery schools.
It has 12,960 rows and 9 categorical dimensions: parents (cardinality 3), has nurs (5), form
(4), children (4), housing (3), finance (2), social (3), health (3), and class (5).
Synthetic dataset. To generate synthetic fact tables, we first fix the number of dimensions
and the dimension cardinalities. Then we generate each row independently, with each of its
column values drawn uniformly and independently from the domain of its dimension.
Error measurement. We compute the error as the absolute difference between the real
count measure computed directly from the fact table and the noisy measure released by one
of the nine ²-differentially private algorithms. The cuboid error is the average error for all
cells in this cuboid. In the following experiments, we report both the max cuboid error and
the average cuboid error among all published cuboids in L.
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Figure 6.1: Varying privacy parameter ² in the Adult dataset
6.2 Experiments
6.2.1 Varying Privacy Parameter ²
We vary privacy parameter ² from 0.25 to 2. Smaller ² implies more privacy and thus more
noise. We use our techniques to publish all cuboids (L = {all cuboids}). Recall Algorithm 2
(for PMost) takes a variance threshold θ0 in the input; here, we set θ0 = 0.5θ
′, where θ′ is
the variance bound found by Algorithm 1 (for BMax).
For the Adult dataset, Figure 6.1 uses a logarithmic scale to show the max/average
error in the released cuboids. As the inconsistent version of an approach always has at
least as much error as the consistent version, the two versions (All/AllC, BMax/BMaxC,
PMost/PMostC, and BMaxG/BMaxGC) are stacked together on a single bar in every his-
togram in Section 6. BMax, PMost, and BMaxG always incur much less error than the two
baselines Base and All. BMaxG is better than BMax and PMost for bounding the max error,
while PMost and BMaxG are better for bounding the average error. Base performs the worst
in terms of the max error, because only the base cuboid is computed from the table, and the
81
 50
 100
 200
 400
 800
 1600
 3200
0.25 0.5 1 1.5 2
Privacy Parameter ε
(a) Max cuboid error
 20
 40
 80
 160
 320
 640
 1280
0.25 0.5 1 1.5 2
Privacy Parameter ε
(b) Average cuboid error
Figure 6.2: Varying privacy parameter ² in the Nursery dataset
noise is magnified significantly when cuboids at higher levels are computed by aggregating
cells in the base cuboid. All is the worst in terms of the average error, for the large amount
of noise initially injected in each cuboid. Error decreases as ² increases.
As suggested by Theorem 4.3.1 (iv)-(v), our consistency enforcing techniques tend to
reduce error, since the variance of the consistent measure cˆ(·) is no larger than that of the
inconsistent c˜(·). So AllC/BMaxC/PMostC/BMaxGC reduces error by 30%-50%, compared
to All/BMax/PMost/BMaxG, while providing the same privacy guarantee. Among all the
algorithms, with consistency enforced, BMaxGC performs the best in terms of the max cuboid
error, and PMostC is the best in terms of the average cuboid error (BMaxGC is close).
The results on the Nursery datasets are depicted in Figure 6.2. We can observe similar
trends. BMaxGC is the best in terms of the max cuboid error, while PMostC performs well
for bounding the average cuboid error. We note that, in this dataset, Base is the best in
terms of the average cuboid error, but it performs badly for bounding the max cuboid error,
which implies it is not stable – sometimes, it may generate small error (in low-level cuboids),
but sometimes it may also generate unacceptably large error (in high-level cuboids). Such
observations coincide with the analysis in Section 3.2. BMaxC, PMostC, and BMaxGC are
close to Base for bounding the average error, but are much better for the max error.
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Figure 6.3: Varying θ0 in Algorithm 2 (for PMost and PMostC)
6.2.2 Varying Variance Threshold θ0
We use the Adult dataset to study how to set the parameter θ0 in Algorithm 2. Recall that
θ0 is a variance threshold. An initial set Lpre of cuboids is selected by Algorithm 2, which
maximizes the number of precise cuboids in L, i.e., cuboids that can be computed from Lpre
with noise variance no more than θ0 (Problem 2). PMost and PMostC use those cuboids Lpre
to compute all cuboids in L (in this experiment, let L = {all cuboids}).
Note that performance of PMost and PMostC depends on the input threshold θ0 in Prob-
lem 2, as θ0 determines Lpre. Fix ² = 1. Given the variance bound θ′ found by Algorithm 1,
we vary θ0 from 0.1θ
′ to 0.9θ′. Figure 6.3 shows how θ0 affects Algorithm 2 on the Adult
dataset. As θ0 increases, we have more precise cuboids, i.e., the released cuboids with noise
variance no more than θ0. When θ0 = θ
′, all 28 = 256 cuboids are precise, and PMost/PMostC
is equivalent to BMax/BMaxC, as the same Lpre is used. But the max/average error of PMost
and PMostC does not increase monotonically with θ0: both θ0 = θ
′ and θ0 = 0.5θ′ are local
optimums for minimizing errors. In the remaining experiments, we set θ0 = 0.5θ
′.
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Figure 6.4: Varying the set L of cuboids to be published
6.2.3 Varying Set of Cuboids to be Published
In this experiment, we vary Lpre, the set of cuboids to be published, in the Adult dataset,
and fix ² = 1. The results are reported in Figure 6.4 for L = {cuboids with dimensionality no
more than 2}, which aggregate the fact table on no more than 2 dimensions, L = {cuboids
with dimensionality no more than 3}, . . . , and L = {cuboids with dimensionality no more
than 6}. Recall in an m-dim cuboid, a cell has non-∗ values on exactly m dimensions. We
now focus on these higher-level cuboids, because they are frequently used in data mining
algorithms, for example, decision tree construction and naive Bayes classifier.
From the results, we can find that Base performs badly for these high-level cuboids.
With the consistency enforced, AllC performs better, but the best two are always PMostC
and BMaxGC. When |L| is smaller, e.g., it contains only cuboids with no more than 2
dimensions, PMostC is the best. When |L| becomes larger, e.g., from 4 to 6, BMaxGC
becomes much better especially in terms of the max noise. This is because the distribution
selection framework Kgen is more general, which enable BMaxGC to find a better choice of
the initial set of cuboids and the amounts of noise to be inserted into each of them.
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Figure 6.5: Max cuboid error as dimensionality varies, when all cuboids are released
6.2.4 Noise in Different Cuboids
Now suppose all cuboids in the Adult dataset are to be published (L = {all cuboids}).
Figure 6.5 shows the max and average error in cuboids of different dimensionalities, for
² = 1. The max error and the average error are calculated for cuboids with m dimensions,
separately, to illustrate how noise is distributed among different levels of the data cube.
As m decreases, a cell in an m-dim cuboid aggregates more rows and base cells. So
Base aggregates more noise from base cells as m drops, and performs the worst for m < 3.
Although it is the best for low-level cuboids with m ≥ 6, its performance deteriorates very
quickly asm decreases. The consistency-enforcing techniques, AllC/BMaxC/PMostC/BMaxGC,
are very effective for small m, reducing error by up to 70%. BMaxGC is the best when
0 < m < 5 in terms of max error, and changes little in all different cuboids. PMostC and
BMaxGC are the best two when 0 < m < 4 in terms of average error.
6.2.5 Scalability: Number and Cardinality of Dimensions
We generate synthetic tables with 4 to 8 dimensions, where each dimension has the same
cardinality 7, and add 108 rows randomly into each of them. We fix ² = 1 and aim to
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Figure 6.7: Varying cardinality of dimensions (7 dimensions)
publish all cuboids. We report the max error and the average error of the seven approaches
in Figure 6.6. As the number of dimensions increases, BMaxGC is always the best one, in
terms of both max and average error. BMaxC is better than PMostC in terms of max error,
while PMostC is better than BMaxC in terms of average error. The error in both All and
Base is much larger and increases faster than the error in others.
We then generate synthetic tables with 7 dimensions, each of which has the same cardi-
nality. We vary the cardinality from 2 to 10, and generate a table with 108 rows randomly
for each. We report the error of each approach, in Figure 6.7, for publishing all cuboids with
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Figure 6.9: Efficiency of different algorithms (subroutines of publishing algorithms)
² = 1. The performance of Base deteriorates quickly as the cardinality increases, because
more cells in the base cuboid need to be aggregated. The performance of All does not change
much, because its performance is mainly determined by the number of cuboids, which is
determined by the total number of dimensions and is fixed here. However, All is not as good
as approaches based on our noise-control frameworks. Again, BMaxGC is the best almost all
the time, and otherwise, BMaxC and PMostC perform the best.
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6.2.6 Efficiency of Different Publishing Algorithms
To test the efficiency of different publishing algorithms, we create two more dimensions, each
of which has cardinality 4, on the fact table in the Adult dataset, and generate their values
randomly for each row. We consider the data cubes generated from the fact table on the
first 5 to all the 10 dimensions. The time to publish the whole data cube is reported in
Figure 6.8, which can be decomposed as follows. Recall that Algorithms 1-3 select Lpre for
BMax/BMaxC, PMost/PMostC, and {λC} for BMaxG/BMaxGC, respectively. The running
time of Algorithms 1-3 is reported in Figure 6.9(a). For different choices of Lpre on the 8-dim
table, the time needed for noise injection (Kpart and Kgen) and consistency enforcement (the
L2-minimization method in Section 4.3) in all cuboids is reported in Figure 6.9(b).
From Figure 6.9(a), although the running time of Algorithms 1-3 is polynomial in 2d,
they are not the bottleneck in data cube publishing. Their running time is always a very
small portion of the overall differentially private data cube publishing time.
From Figure 6.9(b), it is shown that the consistency-enforcement time increases linearly
with |Lpre|, as predicted by Theorem 4.3.1 (ii). The time for noise injection decreases as
|Lpre| increases. This is because when more cuboids are initially injected with noise, less
aggregation of noise is needed to compute all the other cuboids later on.
From Figure 6.8, using consistency enforcement, AllC is especially expensive, because
|Lpre| = 2d in AllC. BMaxC, PMostC, and BMaxGC, although using consistency enforcement,
usually only need 3%-10% time of AllC, because they use smaller Lpre’s. For all approaches,
the publishing time increases exponentially with the dimensionality, mainly because the total
number of cells increases exponentially, which is depicted on the x-axis.
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6.2.7 Background Knowledge v.s. Noise
We now study the relationship between the background knowledge and the error incurred
in the published cuboids. We use the Adult dataset, fix ² = 1, and aim to publish all
the cuboids subject to some background knowledge (some exact cuboids). We consider five
cases: 1) no background knowledge, 2) one exact cuboid as the background knowledge, 3)
two exact cuboids each with one dimensions, 4) two exact cuboids each with two dimensions,
and 5) two exact cuboids each with three dimensions. The one or two cuboids for each case
are selected randomly from all such cuboids. We apply our BMaxGC algorithm, as it is the
best one according to our previous experiments. Noise is calibrated based on Lemma 5.2.2.
Assuming the exact cuboids are known only to adversaries, we report both max error and
average error in Figure 6.10, as “Max Error” and “Avg Error”, respectively.
We observe that, with two exact cuboids, the amount of error increases exponentially in
the number of dimensions. This is because according to Lemma 5.2.2, to preserve individuals’
privacy, the amount of noise needed is proportional to the number of cells in the two exact
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cuboids. So the direct implication is that, when we have to release two or more cuboids
exactly to adversaries, we should avoid releasing the ones with more dimensions (i.e., low-
level cuboids with more details, e.g., {Age, Sex, Salary,Company}). It is acceptable to release
one cuboid or two high-level cuboids (e.g., {Age} and {Sex}) while preserving privacy.
On the other hand, we also note that if the exact cuboids are public knowledge, i.e., known
to both adversaries and normal users, publishing them can reduce noise as their ancestor
cuboids can be computed from them exactly. More specifically, if [C1] ⊆ [C2] and C2 is
known exactly to everyone as the background knowledge, then C1 can be published exactly
without violating the promised privacy guarantee. Keeping this in mind, we re-calculate the
max error and average error and report them in Figure Figure 6.10, as “Max Error (public)”
and “Avg Error (public)”, respectively. We find that, in this case, the max error drops while
the average error almost stays the same. This is because a few cuboids can be computed
directly from the exact cuboids with zero error, and these cuboids are usually high-level ones
which should have had large absolute error, so the max error is reduced. But the number of
such cuboids is small, so the average cuboid error is almost unchanged.
6.3 Summary
Both All and Base are sensitive to the dimensionality of the fact table, and Base is also
sensitive to cardinalities of dimensions. All usually has a large average error, as a large
amount of noise is injected into all cuboids. Base has a large max error, because noise is
aggregated from the base cells; and that is why Base incurs small average errors in the cuboids
close to the base cuboid. BMaxGC and PMostC are the best most of the time. The data
cube published by them has reasonably small amounts of noise in all cuboids. Although the
base cuboid published by BMaxGC and PMostC may have more noise than the one published
by Base, both the average noise and the max noise across all cuboids published by BMaxGC
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and PMostC are significantly smaller than noise in all cuboids published by Base. This is
because in Base, other cuboids aggregate lots of noise from the base cuboid.
BMax/PMost/BMaxG run much faster than BMaxC/PMostC/BMaxGC. But with our con-
sistency enforcement, BMaxC/PMostC/BMaxGC reduce error in BMax/PMost/BMaxG, re-
spectively, by typically 30%-70% or more, and ensure that the published data is consistent.
The error of BMaxC and PMostC is usually only 5%-30% of the error of All, and 20%-50%
of the error of AllC. Note that the y-axis in our figures is always in logarithmic scale. Using
a more general noise-control framework, BMaxGC is even better than BMaxC and PMostC,
especially in terms of the max noise, and reduces error by an addition of 20%-40%.
Because of our consistency-enforcing method, the error of AllC is sometimes comparable
to BMaxG/BMaxGC and PMost/PMostC, when the dimensionality of the fact table is low.
However, AllC is very expensive because |Lpre| in AllC is equal to 2d (recall Theorem 4.3.1 for
the running time of our consistency enforcement). When there are more than five dimensions,
AllC’s publishing time is 10-30 times larger than BMaxGC’s (> 30 times for ten dimensions),
and 10-40 times larger than PMostC’s (> 40 times for ten dimensions).
It is also verified that exact cuboids incur large error in private publishing.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we study how to publish a differentially private data cube in order to support
privacy-preserving data analytics tasks. We address three key issues: data quality (control
noise variance), data consistency, and robustness to background knowledge.
For the issue of data quality, we propose noise control frameworks which insert noise
to some selected cuboids. These initial cuboids together with different amounts of noise
injected into them are called “noise sources”. The remaining cuboids are computed from
these noise sources. Three optimization problem of choosing the noise sources with different
objectives are considered: (i) minimizing the maximal noise over all published cuboids; (ii)
maximizing the number of cuboids with noise below a given threshold; and (iii) minimizing
the maximal relative ratio between real noise variances and user-specified variance thresholds
over all published cuboids. Although problems (i)-(iii) are all NP-hard, we propose efficient
approximation algorithms for them ((ln |L| + 1)2-approximation for (i) and (iii), where |L|
is the number of cuboids to be published, and (1− 1/e)-approximation for (ii)).
For the issue of data consistency, we introduce Lp-distance-minimization framework to
compute a consistent measure from the noisy measure released from our noise control frame-
works. Previous work in [5] is a special case in our framework (p = ∞), and we show that
the L1 version yields a much better theoretical bound on error than the L∞ version. More
surprisingly, we show that in the L2 version, the consistent measure provides even better
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utility than the original inconsistent noisy measure, while the same level of privacy is pre-
served. The main idea is based on the theory of (weighted) least squares, but we provide
efficient algorithms to compute such consistent measures, with running time linear in the
number of cells, while previous techniques have at least quadratic running time.
For the robustness to background knowledge, we try to plug the notation of generic differ-
ential privacy into our noise-control frameworks. We consider some cuboids that have to be
released exactly as the background knowledge, and generalize results in [43] about estimating
generic sensitivity to preserve differential privacy subject to the background knowledge. The
generic sensitivity essentially stands for the relationship between the amount of background
knowledge an adversary has and the amount of noise needed to be injected.
Techniques proposed in this thesis are both proved to be sound in theory and evaluated
experimentally to verify their effectiveness in practice. They provide advanced principles
and major parts of a complete solution to privacy-preserving publishing of data cubes.
7.2 Future Work
We list several interesting future research directions in this part.
• Online noise source optimization problem. As discussed in Section 3.4.3, cuboid queries
may be asked one by one in large data cubes, and we have no knowledge about which
queries will be asked in future. Noise sources Lpre and {λC | C ∈ Lpre} need to
be updated in an online fashion so that once a cuboid queries comes, it must be
answered at once, i.e., covered by Lpre and {λC | C ∈ Lpre}. It is an online decision
problem of how to updating Lpre and {λC | C ∈ Lpre} so that, e.g., the max noise
over all the queries (to be answered or have been answered) is minimize. It has some
connection to the Online Set Cover problem, but is even harder. Our preliminary
result is an O(log5 |L|)-competitive online algorithm (i.e. the solution found online is
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within a factor O(log5 |L|) of the oﬄine optimal after we see all queries). Whether this
competitive ratio can be improved and whether certain assumption on the distribution
of incoming queries helps make the problem easier are open questions.
• Estimating generic sensitivity. Lemma 5.2.2 gives the generic sensitivity subject to
background knowledge of two cuboids (i.e. two cuboids are published exactly). How
to compute the generic sensitivity subject to more than two cuboids is still open.
• Generic differential privacy subject to approximate background knowledge. As indi-
cated by Lemma 5.2.2, to preserve generic differential privacy subject to non-trivial
background knowledge, we often need to inject a large amount of noise into the cuboids
to be released. The noise variance is proportional to the size of cuboids (the number of
cells) in the case of two exact cuboids, and thus may make the released cuboids mean-
ingless. A natural idea is to relax the background knowledge from exact cuboids to
approximate cuboids. For example, instead of releasing exact cuboids, we may release
information like “number of rows satisfying property P is within a range [x− δ, x+ δ]”
as the background knowledge. Whether and how much such approximate background
knowledge helps reduce the sensitivity and thus the noise variance are open.
• Assumption about adversaries. In many studies, even using the original notation of
privacy, differentially private algorithms usually insert too much noise to the released
data or the query answers. The reason is simply that the strongest possible adversaries
are considered in differential privacy, with the infinite computational power and infinite
background knowledge. Varying the mysterious parameter ² does not help as this
assumption stays the same. An interesting and fundamental question is: whether we
can build a hierarchy of privacy notations and guarantees based on the amount of
background knowledge and the computational power available to adversaries. Then
users can select one based their need for balance between privacy and utility.
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• Privacy on emerging data types and system models. This is a more general question.
It is worth our effort to study data privacy on emerging data types, like Big Data, and
system models, like Cloud Computing and Storage, in both of which privacy becomes
an even more important issue. Differential privacy will meet lots of new challenges,
and we are wondering whether it can be adapted there, maybe after relaxation (we
will have more flexibility on choosing noise sources in those scenarios), or we need to
propose completely new notations or policies about “privacy”.
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